"Indigenous Women, Social Movement Perspectives, and Lessons from Bolivia's Post-liberal Transformations."

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Abstract

In Bolivia, indigenous women have contributed to President Morales’ and MAS (Movement Toward Socialism) electoral victories and are exercising an emerging influence on the government’s decisions on policy. This contrasts with their experiences with failed policy efforts prior to the early 2000s, which presents an interesting puzzle for social movement theories. These theories argue that the language of repertoires and framing processes, resources of social movements, along with structural opportunities, are important causes of social movement success. Research on social movement outcomes is needed to understand indigenous women’s changing relationship with society and the government. As indigenous women’s influence on policy has scarcely been studied, and only in relation to a few policy areas, this study broadens our understanding of the range of social movement influence.

I conduct qualitative historical analysis of primary and secondary data to test hypotheses about indigenous women’s social movements in Bolivia between 2003 and 2012. I investigate the impact of organizational, state, and international variables on gas and food subsidies protests, and the territorial conflict in the TIPNIS region. The major finding of this article is that indigenous women need to confront very open political opportunities with very high amounts of human capital resources—especially women in leadership roles and strong networks—in order to have a significant impact on policy outcomes.
I. Introduction

Indigenous women have had a presence in indigenous movements for at least the past thirty years, but, given their struggles with racial and gendered discrimination at institutional and societal levels, their ability to impact policy has truly only been evident since the 2000s. Their most impressive influences include their leadership in natural resource nationalizations (gas and water) that occurred over protracted bloody struggles in the early 2000s. Another notable impact includes their mobilization for Evo Morales’ presidential campaign, which significantly changed the course of politics in the country. Women also mobilized in the same time period for more gender-equitable agricultural reform, and achieved an unprecedented success. Taking place at the forefront of most of these battles, they have gained confidence in attempting to influence government policy in similar ongoing battles. This contrasts with an earlier period of low access to political institutions and very low influence over government policy. What are the actual steps taken from being a poor, marginalized group of activists to becoming a strong group of activists that help shape policy? Are marginalized groups in social movements more likely to change policy under certain types of organizational and structural settings? Policy success and failure of female indigenous women in Latin America presents important puzzles for questions of democratization, identity politics, gender rights and especially, social movements. How well do theories of social movements explain indigenous women’s surprising success in influencing Bolivian political outcomes in recent years? I propose that a beneficial way of approaching this question is by investigating indigenous women’s mobilization and outcomes during important movements to change policy, or “policy moments.” The policy moments emphasized in
this article include gas nationalization protests, land reform, gas and food subsidy protests, and the 2011-2012 TIPNIS highway conflict, supplemented with noteworthy shadow comparisons.

In many states in Latin America, the indigenous are a significant portion of the population, and have a prolonged history of mixed outcomes in negotiations with governments—from land redistribution programs, ejido arrangements, patronizing cooptation, to militarized action in indigenous regions. The tensions between governments and the mobilization of indigenous people often illuminate the challenge of incorporating marginalized groups into democratic citizenship. Since the return to democratic rule in 1985 in Bolivia, indigenous groups have become ever more active in national politics, and their ongoing struggles with the state have taken on new dimensions of organization and participation in democratic settings. For indigenous women, who have traditionally been among the region’s most marginalized, social movements have particular importance, as more formal channels to organization have often been closed. Studies on social movement outcomes are especially relevant to indigenous politics in Latin America because indigenous peoples in the Americas have organized more through social movements than political parties, corporate interest groups, or guerilla movements (Chase Smith 1984 and Brysk 2000). Social movements are also important because they have led to the formation of political parties and electoral victories of indigenous candidates (Van Cott 2000).

This article makes several major contributions to the literature on social movements through an intensive study of indigenous women’s attempts to change policy. First, it expands the literature on social movement resource mobilization by underscorin
the relationship between material and human resources: high levels of female leadership may be more important than mere numbers in participation and financial resources. In addition, it investigates a complicated relationship between networking resources, wherein marginalized groups may be exploited but not rewarded for their efforts. Moreover, this research extends the cultural and framing literature beyond explaining the emergence and mobilization of social movements into understanding how these factors impact policy outcomes. This article compares social movements’ ability to impact policy in four different policy areas, building upon other work that has investigated similar dependent variables (especially Deere and León 1998; Deere and León 2001; Deere and León 2002; Deere and León 2002a). This article also theorizes a hard case for social movement theories, related to indigenous women’s extreme marginalization and lowered access to resources and structures that scholars posit as contributors to social movement success. Finally, the intersectional lens (see Burns 2007; Castillo 2006; Acosta-Belen 1993) of this article contributes to a more thorough understanding of how class, gender, and race or ethnicity, contribute to social movement outcomes.

In the next three sections of this article, I outline the theoretical expectations concerning the organizational, state, and international variables that shape the outcome of indigenous women’s policy efforts. I then detail the methods and research undertaken to investigate these variables and the variation found between cases, and proceed to present the general findings from qualitative historical analysis of two cases of indigenous women’s protest in Bolivia. I conclude with the theoretical implications and lessons for mobilization suggested by the findings.
II. Literature and Hypotheses

Organizational Features of Social Movements Influencing Indigenous Women’s Policy Success

Resources

Drawing from the classic resource mobilization approach (Foweraker 1991, McCarthy and Zald 2003), various authors have drawn conclusions about the role of resources—especially networking and professionalization of leadership— in contributing to indigenous women’s policy outcomes. For example, women in the Zapatista struggles have taken advantage of resources through transnational and national movements (Castillo 2003; Sierra 2001, Seider and Sierra 2010; Kampwirth 2002, 2004; Speed et al 2006; Rousseau 2011). This activity has created opportunity for the “consolidation of women’s spaces in male-dominated indigenous organizations and for the emergence of indigenous women’s own networks” (Rousseau 2011: 10). Lucero (2008) highlights the role of networks within the state as an important determinant of success for indigenous movements in Ecuador and Bolivia, as social movement organizations have become key actors in current networks of representation in Latin America. Resources that include high amounts of numbers within organizations, strong networks, and a higher presence of women in leadership positions are hypothesized to be associated with successful policy outcomes, depending on other variables, especially the position taken by the state on any particular issue. On the other hand, the absence of these variables is expected to contribute to failure for indigenous women’s policy goals. This research aims to further

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1 However, Brysk (2000) argues that outcomes across countries in Latin America.
our knowledge of how different resources impact marginalized groups’ ability to impact policy.

**Frames**

In analyses of “new social movements”, scholars ask how language, culture, and meaning affect social movements, and have determined that collective action frames are important for providing diagnostic and prognostic solutions and motivation for mobilization (Snow et al 2004; Davies 1999; Gamson 1992; Carroll and Ratner 1992). But social movements use frames to achieve other goals as well. As Caniglia and Carmin (2005) write:

In particular, they use them as a means to bridge or connect to potential members, to amplify and clarify their existing views and beliefs as well as to shape the beliefs of others, to extend their frame so that it is salient to a broader audience, and to transform the way the organization is perceived either by integrating new views or replacing those that already are present (Caginlia and Carmin 2005: 205).

Although the cultural, framing approaches generally are used to explain mobilization instead of mobilization outcomes, Brysk (2000) points out that framing and identity politics is an important part of explaining why people get involved in politics, but also in understanding how social movements change politics (35). While they empower members and raise public consciousness, identity-based movements can change political institutions and behavior (Brysk 2008: 35). This viewpoint articulates that social movement cultural components affect political outcomes, and informs my hypothesis that indigenous women’s frames may affect policy outcomes.
Exploring how this identity translates into mobilization is an interesting exploration of the role of frames in social movement research, because the reality is that although cultural and framing scholarship has deepened our perceptions of the importance of these variables for mobilization, the evidence has not truly led to solid expectations of how they impact outcomes. Drawing from the framing literature about the importance of appealing to larger segments of society, I posit that non-gendered and non-ethnic (broad) frames are likely to be more successful than those that emphasize the gender and ethnicity of the participants in social movements. This hypothesis assumes that indigenous identity may need to be downplayed to win the support of other members of society and achieve social movement goals.

The State Political Opportunity Structure

Previous scholarship finds that the opportunity structures (Tarrow 1983; Tilly 1978) represented by the state and other contexts affect social movement dynamics—both in formation/emergence and in operation. I posit that Tarrow’s major arenas of political structure will affect indigenous women in terms of policy: openness of formal political access, stability of alignments within the political system, and the availability of strategic posture of potential alliances (Tarrow 1983: 27-33). Following cues from political opportunity/process theorizing, I hypothesize from the political opportunity perspective that political openings within the state can generate more successful policy.

reveal that institutional arrangements—including neoliberal institutions, party institutionalization, weakening institutions, and features of electoral institutions—have strong impacts on the political opportunity structure and the emergence of social movement protest (Yashar 1999; Van Cott 2001, 2003; Van Cott and Rice 2006; Arce and Mangonnet 2012; Machado et al., 2009). The institutional research informatively addresses the political opportunities involved in different aspects of social movement mobilization, and it can be taken further to inquire how these political opportunity structures align with different policy outcomes. Studying Bolivia contributes to the institutional literature by studying a case of weak institutions and their interaction with social movements in policies. I therefore assess different levels of opportunity across various cases in order to determine whether, as hypothesized, open political opportunity structures coincide more commonly with success or failure.

**Neoliberalism, Leftist Leadership**

Economic crises have had a profound effect on the ability of government to meet the needs of emerging voices, and developmental strategies (many of which originate from modernization philosophy) have affected the survival and resources of indigenous regions and women (Langer 2003; Yashar 2005; Jacquette 2006; Deere 2001). As Jacquette (2006) points out, as Latin America follows the prescriptions of the IMF and the World Bank for development, social spending is limited, regulations on private capital are reduced, and incomes of the middle class and those below it suffer tremendously (27, 36). Moreover, scholars assert that non-economic neoliberal policies have been shown to be unfavorable to indigenous women’s interests, due to
individualistic legalism and universal (mainstreaming) policies that are associated with neoliberal styles of governing (Clisby 2005).

The other side of the role of neoliberalism is the role of leftist leadership. Especially in Latin America, where neoliberal reforms have produced uneven results, the twenty-first century has seen a resurgence of leftist politics. The left has a long history of identification with indigenous and women’s claims, even if it has not always been a genuine one (Bouvier 2009; Rice and Van Cott 2006). Leftist governments’ association with more egalitarian gender, class, and racial outlooks lead to the expectation that indigenous women’s policies will receive more favorable treatment under such leadership. I hypothesize that states with a stronger commitment to neoliberal economic policies will produce less policy success in the areas commonly challenged by indigenous women. On the other hand, where states are rolling back neoliberal economic policies, instituting nationalization projects, or pursuing other heterodox economic efforts, policy success in these areas should be more evident for indigenous women.

**International Influences**

Various international factors may have positive or negative effects on indigenous women’s goals. Much scholarship has focused on the role of economic internationalization or globalization and international law. A reading of the international economic literature relating to the role of international trade provides conflicting evidence about the role of international influences on indigenous women’s movements. Various scholars point to the role of international law and norms in aiding indigenous women in mobilization (Brysk 2000; Albó 2001; Bengoa 2000; Rice and Van Cott 2006;
However, neoliberalism has involved massive cooperation between governments and international lending institutions like the IMF, whose influences often run counter to mass preferences (Rakowski 1994; Oliveira and Roberts 1994; Postero 2008; Perreault 2006). Based on this reading of the role of international factors on social movements, I hypothesize generally that international factors creating a supportive environment for indigenous women will increase their chances of policy success, but significant international opposition will decrease their ability to achieve favorable policy outcomes. However, this hypothesis is conditioned by the expectation that international structural forces are expected to interact with framing, organizational, and other state-level structural factors to produce outcomes in policy.

In order to explicate the full picture of social movement influences on policy, I argue along with Lucero (2008), Eckstein (2001) and Foweraker (1999), that an integrated approach between theoretical viewpoints is warranted, and therefore have hypothesized the role of multiple variables in the cases of indigenous women’s movements in Bolivia. Table 1 presents a summary of the hypotheses discussed above.
### Table 1: Summary of Hypotheses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Relationship</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hypothesis 1</strong></td>
<td>Indigenous women’s movements with higher amounts of resources will be more likely to achieve successful policy outcomes than those with lower amount of resources.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Hypothesis 1a</strong></td>
<td>Indigenous women’s movements that contain higher numbers of protesters and members will be more likely to achieve success than those with lower numbers.</td>
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<td><strong>Hypothesis 1b</strong></td>
<td>Indigenous women’s movements that possess strong networks with the government and other movements will be more likely to succeed than those with weak networks.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Hypothesis 1c</strong></td>
<td>Indigenous women’s movements with strong leadership of women in will be more likely to achieve policy success than those with weak leadership.</td>
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<td><strong>Hypothesis 2</strong></td>
<td>Indigenous women’s movements that voice non-gendered, non-ethnic frames will be more likely to succeed than those which employ gendered and ethnic frames.</td>
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<td><strong>Hypothesis 3</strong></td>
<td>Indigenous women’s movements that encounter openings in the political opportunity structure are more likely to succeed than those that encounter closures in the system.</td>
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<td><strong>Hypothesis 3a</strong></td>
<td>Indigenous women’s movements that encounter strong neoliberal commitment will be less likely to succeed than those that encounter weak neoliberal commitments.</td>
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<td><strong>Hypothesis 4</strong></td>
<td>Indigenous women’s movements that receive international support will be more likely to succeed than those that receive international opposition.</td>
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III. Data and Methods

Case Selection and Data

Bolivia was chosen as an interesting setting due to the marginalization of women there and due to the fact that it is a historically important case of indigenous and indigenous women’s social mobilization. However, it also shares a number of characteristics that make comparisons across Latin America possible, including Spanish colonization, some shared indigenous histories, and, especially, a common, euro-centric “machista”2 culture. Bolivian women represent a “hard case” for social movement theory due to the fact that they often lack the components theoretically deemed necessary for social movement success, such as resources and networks.

Individual case selection was conducted by identifying major protest events (and the policy response to those events) between 2003-2012 and selecting events that portrayed a variety of values on the dependent and independent variables in order to present a probabilistic explanation of the unfolding of events (Mahoney 2004: 84). The cases of the Gas war, land reform, gas and food subsidies protests, and TIPNIS mobilization present wide variation on all relevant variables. These also provide sufficient variation in the type of policy sought—while several are related to anti-neoliberal aims, several other, non-neoliberal cases are represented in the cases selected. This variation seeks to uncover whether or not non-economic policies are affected by neoliberal styles of governing. In addition, I make “shadow” comparisons with cases of indigenous women’s mobilization from the 1990s, which carry many different values on the relevant variables.

2 “Machista,” a Spanish term, refers to the cultural elevation of masculine attributes.
Secondary data include various types of scholarly research, newspaper articles from daily Bolivian and other Latin American daily newspapers (including *El Diario, El Mundo, El Deber*, and *La Jornada*, among others), social movement\(^3\) publications, government documents and legal analyses. I also made use of data collected from international organizations, online news sources, and websites of various NGOs and indigenous women’s activist organizations. I placed a special emphasis on the most widely known group, Bartolina Sisa.\(^4\) Also included are NGOs like UNICEF, UNIFEM, FoodFirst, Access to Land and Right to Property of Women in Bolivia (supported by Habitat for Humanity), Center for the Promotion of Women, Bolivia, CIPCA (Center for the Investigation and Promotion of Peasants), OMAQ Mujeres (Organization of Aymara-Qullasuyo Women), Bolivian Women Against Violence, and CEDLA (Center for Studies and Latin American Documentation), among others. Among international organizations, I consulted the websites and documents of the United Nations, ILO, and Economic Commission on Latin American and the Caribbean. State and government organizational documents included those from the *CLA Fact Book*, the United States State Department, Bolivian government archived documents (i.e., the constitutions and legal code), and documents from other Bolivian government agencies such as Mujer Coordinadora (Women’s Coordination). These data are translated,\(^5\) analyzed, and coded by international support for indigenous women’s issues, state structural opportunity

\(^3\) Examples include the National Confederation of Peasant Indigenous, and Native Women of Bolivia, Bartolina Sisa (Bartolina Sisa) OMAQ Mujeres (Organization of Aymara Qullasuyo Women) and Mujeres Contra Violencia (Women Against Violence).

\(^4\) The most influential women’s organization in Bolivia is named after national heroine Bartolina Sisa, wife of the famed anti-colonial insurrectionary who was executed in 1781. Thereafter, Bartolina continued to lead natives against the Spanish colonizing forces until her execution in 1782 (Bartolina Sisa 2011; Morales 2009).

\(^5\) All translations are those of the author, except where otherwise noted.
openings or closings, levels of organizational resources, and changes in organizational frames.

Field research data draws from observation of social movement organizational activities, two focus group sessions, and eleven open-ended, unstructured interviews with female indigenous movement participants and social movement leaders from June-July of 2011. The main participants were members of the Confederation of Bolivian Peasant Indigenous Native Women (“Bartolina Sisa” hereafter) in La Paz, Bolivia. Interviews and focus session data are coded based on their characterizations of organizational, state, and international variables.

**Variables, Coding, and Analysis**

The main analytical strategy of this article involves qualitative historical analysis of secondary and primary sources, supplemented with field research data. The use of case study methods is necessary because, though significant in population, many obstacles exist to collecting reliable, large-N quantitative data on indigenous women that can answer how their social movements impact policy. Also, case-based designs are useful in situations confronted in this research—including the problem of multi-conjunctural causality—which scholars point out can be confronted only through the rigorous contextual analysis of specific cases (George and Bennett 2005). The multiple identities engaged in intersectional social movements serve to complicate the already complex task of identifying causes with multiple actors and varied stages of decision-making. I evaluate my hypotheses about the role of organizational, state, and international variables by conducting a structured-focused comparative case study of various policy moments in which indigenous women were engaged in social protest between 2003-2012. This
involves the cataloguing of various materials according to the ways in which they portrayed the important theoretical variables. These include the dependent variable, the policy outcome at specific time points in response to policy (“policy moments”), and independent variables, state variables (neoliberalism, political opportunity structure), organizational variables (resources and frames), and international variables (international support).

Policy outcomes are coded as successful (indigenous women’s goals achieved), mixed (partial goals achieved), and failed (no goals achieved), based on evidence provided by scholars, legislative reports, activist statements and publications, and news reports. Organizational characteristics are analyzed in social movement publications, scholarly analyses, and news reports, and resources are coded as high, moderate, or low. Based on specialist assessments, NGO reports, social movement publications, and news reports, leadership of women is coded as strong, moderate or weak. Social movement frames, analyzed through social movement publications, websites, photos, and news reports, are coded according to whether they possess broad, ethnic or gendered language. Neoliberalism is coded as strong, moderate or weak, based on the Wall Street Journal Index of Economic Freedom (Wall Street Journal 2012). Finally, state political opportunity structures are coded as open, partially open, or closed, based on qualitative scholarly assessments, composite readings of electoral data, news reports, and statements made by government officials. Finally, international influences are coded as obstructive, moderately supportive, or supportive, based on specialist assessments, INGO publications, activist statements, and news reports, and reflect whether or not significant opposition or support came from relevant international organizations or entities.
Table 2 presents the cases and outcomes explored within this article.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gas Nationalization 2003</td>
<td>Failure</td>
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<td>Gas Nationalization 2004</td>
<td>Failure</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gas Nationalization 2005-6</td>
<td>Success</td>
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<tr>
<td>Land Reform (2006)</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gas and Food Prices</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIPNIS Conflict</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2: Selected Cases and Coding**

**IV. Cases**

**Nationalization of Natural Gas**

While the importance of indigenous women’s protests and their contribution to the victory over ending water privatization is well documented (Bennett et al 2005; Bakker 2008; Laurie et al 2002; Lewis and Olivera 2004), indigenous women’s protest over the nationalization of gas in vital policy moments in 2003, 2004 and 2005 is less documented and yet equally important. Indigenous women engaged massive amounts of human capital resources during the Gas War, becoming such massive symbols of the movement that various statues of traditional Aymara women have been erected in El Alto to commemorate indigenous women’s contributions. They were also important figures in protests to urge Mesa to nationalize gas in 2004, and later to protest the referendum on gas issued by the Mesa administration in 2005. As scholars, NGO organizations, and journalists argue, the leadership of indigenous women was vital to the success of the
movement (Monasterios 2007; Jimenez 2003; Liendo 2009; Paco et al 2009; Vàsquez 2006). Their involvement was also indicative of a major shift in the power of indigenous women, as they became acknowledged as legitimate representatives of a large part of society (Monasterios 2007; Vàsquez 2006).

Plans to privatize Bolivia’s natural gas reserves go back as far as Sanchez de Lozada’s first term in the 1990s (El Internationalista 2003; El Diario 1995a, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c). In 2003, one year after his second election to office, the president faced massive national protests that shut down government offices and trade routes into cities over the issue. In these protests, indigenous women marched as part of an alliance with neighborhood associations, leading strikes and holding blockades under the wiphala flag, vocalizing, in indigenous languages, their dissent with governments that had consistently shut indigenous women out of economic and political life. Women’s desperation resulting from economic problems has become an integral part of their activist message: government policy must change because their role in carrying on generations and providing for them is seriously threatened.

As women, when we have a “wawa,” 6 in work, they do not accept you. “With your pollera you are lumpy like a cow.” They (employers) always criticized us like this. My husband does not work anymore, and does not maintain me. Now I have four children. My children are in school. I have returned to work, but I earn little. In Bolivia, women work, but earn little. The man earns, say, one thousand and women earn four hundred bolivianos…And what our husbands earn does not cover us, and because of that we work hard for those four hundred bolivianos to

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6 Aymaran word for baby or small child.
maintain our children, so they do not suffer from (want of) food, so that they do not suffer from (want of) clothes. The “wawas” ask for clothes, health, shelter and food. Four things. We women have suffered much. (Cabezas 2006:77)

While many sectors were involved in the natural gas protests, there was a distinctive indigenous and female voice, as indigenous women, the nation’s poorest and hardest working, became the symbol for a “new nationalism” based on the popular appropriation of Bolivia’s natural resources (Monasterios 2007; Vásquez 2006).

Sanchez de Lozada fled the country in the face of these protests, and his vice president, Carlos Mesa, assumed the presidency. Mesa put the nationalization issue to referendum in 2004, which was returned in favor of the privatization of natural gas. This prompted even more protest by the nation’s indigenous people, who claimed the government intentionally misled voters by using confusing terminology in the referendum (Dangl 2005). This period of anti-privatization activity met with an unyielding, closed political opportunity structure, as indigenous women met with presidential administrations had de-prioritized indigenous justice in favor of economic development (Webber 2005; Webber 2005b; BBC 2004; Agramont 2012; Van Cott 2000:195).

International companies and lending institutions placed a great deal of pressure on the Bolivian government to increase privatization of natural resources in the country as conditions for further lending (Kohl 2004; Eurodad 2006; PBS 2002; Samper 2003). As Kohl (2004) and La Razon (2003) report, in early 2003 the IMF demanded that the Bolivian government reduce its deficit from 8.5% to 5.5% of its GDP, or by $240 million. The government agreed to cut spending by $30 million and to raise another $80
million from hydrocarbon taxes, as well as $90 million from a new universal income tax (Kohl 2004: 894; La Razon 2003; Samper 2003). In response to the protests, on May 6, 2005, Congress passed a new law raising taxes from 18% to 32% on profits from foreign companies. However, Mesa refused to take any action on the bill, which meant that the Senate President had to sign the bill for it to be legitimate, according to Bolivian law (Gomez 2005). Nonetheless, social movements rejected the law (which failed to be implemented anyway) and becried subsequent attempts by the Mesa government to call for a constituent assembly and a referendum on autonomy in the Santa Cruz region. Two years after Sanchez de Lozada’s resignation, Mesa resigned amid protests involving as high as a half million people, leaving the country under temporary rule of Supreme Court President Eduardo Rodríguez Veltzé (El Mundo 2005; El Diario 2005). This event changed the political structure: in 2005, MAS won significant seats in the senate and a majority of seats in the lower house, cocalero union leader Evo Morales won the presidency, and a referendum in favor of a new constituent assembly. In this context, President Morales passed an executive decree on May 1, 2006 that nationalized hydrocarbons resources and declared the state the owner of the revenues (DeShazo 2006; Perreault 2008; CEDIB 2006).

While the Gas War is viewed as one case, it exhibits several distinct data points to analyze. The first “policy moment” identified is the 2003 mobilization against privatization, ending with the ousting of Sanchez de Lozada. But this policy moment is coded as a failure, even though the president was replaced in response to the protests, because the end result was not policy change. The next important moment came with Mesa’s referendum, which is coded as a failure for indigenous women’s policy efforts.
The final outcome and policy moment is defined in 2006 with the instatement of the new hydrocarbons executive decree. This moment is coded as a success for indigenous women, who had not only participated in the successful mass sector uprising, but had taken on more prominent roles to accomplish this goal.

Several variables of interest are highlighted by the case of gas nationalization. First, news reports and activist accounts reveal that very high resources, brought about through strong networks with the government, were present during the final success, but were absent during the previous attempts to change policy, marking the importance of networks and resources, as hypothesized. Indigenous women’s use of gendered, ethnic, and broad frames during the Gas War indicates that gendered and ethnic claims do not damage indigenous women’s chances of success, contrary to the framing hypothesis. This is true especially when these types of frames interact with open opportunity structures, like significant electoral changes and changes to the law and political institutions. The existence of political opportunities within the current administration and the positive outcome for indigenous women also increases confidence in the hypothesis that political open opportunity structures increase indigenous women’s chances of favorable policy outcomes.

During first two “policy moments” under investigation, the neoliberal is coded as declining (Wall Street Journal 2012). The change brought about through MAS victories during the 2005 presidential and congressional elections (electionguide.org 2013) signaled the beginning of the fusion between social movements and a new, leftist government. Weak neoliberal commitment occurs with the successful outcome on the dependent variable, while failures are associated with stronger neoliberal commitment.
Interestingly, however, international influences signified by the IMF and World Bank’s opposition, are conditionally important.

Similar to the neoliberal variable, international opposition to the nationalization of gas succeeded when neoliberal commitments were high and political opportunity structures were closed to indigenous women. The IMF’s preferences had a strong influence under neoliberal governments, but were unable to stop the momentum of social movement demands once Evo Morales was elected and neoliberal commitments within the state had become much weaker. The Gas War illustrates the importance of understanding the interactions between organizational, state, and international characteristics, as specific combinations of coding on these variables result in different outcomes. Specifically, broad, ethnic and gendered frames, very high resources, closed political opportunity structures, neoliberal commitments, and international opposition result in failure. Changing the state variables to open political opportunities, neoliberal decline, and strong networks with the state, results in success. This observation leads to the conclusion that state features are especially important determinants of social movement success in policy.

**Gasoline and Food Prices**

After indigenous women and the rest of civil society had won the war against gas and water privatization in the early 2000s, their willingness to tackle government policy on other issues was illustrated well by the protests they led during the early months of 2011. Plans to end government subsidies on gasoline in the country had been announced and abandoned previously by the Morales administration, until the government
unexpectedly acted to remove the subsidies in late December 2010 (Shahriari 2011). Bolivian consumer prices grew 1.76 percent from November to December 2010, the highest jump since May 2008 (Shahriari 2011). Mobilizing impressive human capital resources, indigenous women comprised up to seventy-five percent of the laborers, volunteers, miners, and poor who took to the streets in response to the immediate hikes in food prices (including sugar, chicken, rice, and beef). Familiar images of pollera skirts and bowler hat-clad women marching under a whiphala flag emerged, as witnessed during the major Water and Gas Wars of the previous decade (Vásquez 2006; Hylton et al 2004; Cabezas 2006; Monasterios 2007; Ramírez 2003). Indigenous women’s frames of activism on the issue of gas and food subsidies were very much aligned with their roles as indigenous women, reflecting not only gendered, but also ethnic, language in their framing of issues. For example, Adriana Salamanca, president of the Female Civic Committee in Cochabamba, stated, “…(indigenous women) in Cochabamba now we are treating the theme of the family basket because we are the most affected by the administration of the home economy” (ANF 2011). Corina Ramírez of the Bartolina Sisa stated, “As women, we are going to rise up because we are passing crisis. For this reason, we have entered into a state of emergency” (ANF 2011).

The protests sent the government scurrying to reinstate the gasoline subsidy. While this initial victory was hopeful, the price hikes continued to crisis levels, leading to further and wider protest. Two such protests were powerful enough to have Morales removed from public appearances by his security forces (Van Auken 2011; Valdez 2011; BBC 2011). As gas and staple item prices soared, and the production of food decreased by 35% from earlier seasons (Vreeken 2011), protesters demanded price controls or
increasing subsidized food provision (La Jornada 2011; ANF 2011; Alcoreza 2011; ANF 2011; Los Tiempos 2011). Instead, the government reached a pre-agreement with the COB (Centro Obrero Boliviano or Central Bolivian Workers) in April to commit to an 11% increase in salaries, after which the workers agreed to suspend strikes and roadblock activities for twelve days (AFP 2011a). However, the government failed to respond adequately to the resulting food shortages and price increases, which most affected indigenous women. This lack of response reflects a partially open political opportunity structure. Less consequential than domestic influences, international opposition to gas subsidies is represented by World Bank and IMF prescriptions for ending the subsidies (Croady et al 2010; IMF 2007; World Bank 2010).

A public scuffle between the COB and the government over wages, ultimately overshadowing the issues around food and gas, finally came to an end in January 2012 when Morales issued Supreme Decree 1213. The executive order increased the minimum national salary to close to U.S.$143, under an agreement with the COB (ANF 2012), which would neglect most indigenous women, whose main sources of employment lie in the informal economy (World Bank 2002). Therefore, the outcome of these protests was mixed; some success can be observed in that the government rescinded its decision to cut subsidies, but the case represents failure in that the government did not respond to alleviate the rising food prices for indigenous women.

The initial success and later failure for indigenous women’s claims during the gas subsidies protests is a surprising mixed outcome, given that similar organizational, state, and international characteristics provided successful outcomes on similar issues during this period. Resources are coded as high, including strong network ties, but the existence
of these networks made a remarkable difference by creating a range of preferences for the
government to consider. The mixed outcome is likely due to the nature of the networks
and the political opportunity structure regarding this issue. Specifically, indigenous
women engaged a broader societal goal that was initially settled in favor of the most
vocal and powerful organization (COB), while their goals were sidelined. Important is
that the political opportunity structure did not change significantly overall from the Gas
War, but is relatively closed in the case of gas and food subsidies as a result of the
government’s determination to accomplish other goals (in this case, balance budgets).
The exhibited weakness of (specifically, western) international influence on Bolivia’s
current regime gives reason to doubt that it makes a substantial impact on the outcome.

**Land Reform**

The reforms made to the INRA (National Institute of Agrarian Reform) since the
election of Evo Morales have signified victories for indigenous people and indigenous
women, and INRA policy is coded as a successful case of policy influence. Indigenous
women’s mobilization in demand of gender equity in land distribution gained new
momentum in the period during the Gas and Water Wars. Continued inequitable land
titling for indigenous people as a community was still the operating norm, and land
inequality in Bolivia remained, despite previous reforms (including INRA), the most
extreme in Latin America (CEDLA 2010). In addition, land titling for women was a focal
point of indigenous women’s involvement during their supportive activism for Evo
Morales’ presidential campaign. It was also a large element of their protests calling for a
new constitutional assembly (Bueno and Datta 2011; Villarroel 2011). 60 governmental,
non-governmental, and local organizations supported and sent delegates to the National
Meeting for the Access of Women to Land, which met on October 30, 2009 to discuss needed additional reforms to the 2006 measures (discussed more fully below) to the INRA. They report:

56 years after the promulgation of the Agrarian Reform Degree, and 13 years after the INRA law, our right to access to land is not guaranteed. In the period 1997 to 2006, out of 29,063 titles issued, only 4,973 were done for women. That is to say, that only 17 of every 100 titles that were issued were for women. (*Ukhamawa Noticias 2009: 2)*

A vitally important political opportunity affecting indigenous women’s success in land reform issues is the unique relationship between the Morales government and the MAS social movement, which is comprised of mainly indigenous social movement organizations. Analysts point out contradictions between the MAS as a social movement and a “state actor” (Mayorga 2008:6). *MAS, which identifies itself as a social movement and not a political party, engages in decision-making within the governing apparatus and holds powerful positions in terms of influencing policy (Mayorga 2008:6). In this structural environment, Morales began working on land and agricultural reform during his first year as president, producing Law 3545 in revision to Law 1751 (INRA), which mandated redistribution of nearly 48 million acres and appropriation of illegally held or idle lands (Bolivia 2006). In response to indigenous women’s demands, it also gave, guarantee and priority to the participation of women in the processes of clearing and distribution of lands. In case of marriage and free conjugal unions or titles executed will be emitted in favor of both conjugees or cohabitating partners that*

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7 This data is corroborated by information released by Fundación Tierra (2010)
8 Analysts have expressed concerns that a governing social movement may begin to lose its participatory, bottom-up organization in favor of the pattern of hierarchy and co-optation that occurs in many populist parties (Mayorga 2008:6).
work the land, consigning the name of the women in the first place. Equal
treatment will be offered in other cases of joint-ownership between men and
women who work the land, independently of their marital status (Bolivia 2006:
Final Disposition 8).\(^9\)

International organizations generally support gender equity in land reform, both
as a social justice measure and as a tool for economic development. The United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples establishes that “states shall provide
effective mechanisms for the prevention of, and redress for … any action which has the
aim or effect of dispossessing them of their lands, territories or resources (United Nations
2008: Article 8, Section 2b). In addition, ILO 169 contains specific provisions regarding
the rights of indigenous peoples to indigenous lands and territories, which were addressed
by the legal changes in the 1990s regarding indigenous peoples. One measure taken by
the Bolivian government reflecting these principles includes the first passage of the
INRA in 1996. In addition to these agreements, indigenous women called upon the state
to honor the signing of the CEDAW (Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
against Women) and prevent discrimination on land titling (Ukhamawa Noticias 2009: 2;
Fundación Tierra 2010).\(^10\) While this international support is impressive, it is worth
noting that in previous decades, the same level of international support for gendered land
redistribution did not result in the outcome witnessed after the significant change in the
political opportunity structure.

Of the cases presented in this article, indigenous women’s most significant
accomplishment is the revisions made to the INRA in 2006, after Evo Morales’ election.
Women’s land ownership is a subject that once placed them at odds with their state and

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\(^9\)See also Köppen 2008; Jordán 2010, and Fundación Tierra (2010).
\(^10\) This data is corroborated by information released by Fundación Tierra (2010)
their communities; in the 1990s, this conflict was enough to effectively silence the
gendered goals of land reform efforts (Salguero 1995:48; Deere and León 2002a: 72).
Indigenous women’s resources are coded as very high for the case of land reform,
reflecting large numbers, strong networks, and high amounts of women’s leadership in
the movement. In addition, their frames were gendered and ethnic, and, having reached
success, refute the hypothesis that such frames would damage movements’ chances for
policy success. The open political opportunity structure that came with new connections
to the state through MAS and Evo Morales’ electoral victories aided the goals of
indigenous women’s movements, as hypothesized. Land reform efforts displayed an
emerging leadership of women in addition to impressive state connections. International
influences for the issue of land reform are coded as supportive, but as referenced above,
these influences are not seen as highly significant in light of other cases of international
support that failed (like earlier land reform measures).

**The TIPNIS Conflict**

The struggles of indigenous people in the National Park and Indigenous TCO
Isiboro-Secure (hereafter referred to as TIPNIS) provides an interesting test of the
hypotheses about the role of organizational, state, and international characteristics on a
social movement’s ability to influence policy. The TIPNIS region covers around 1.1
million hectares in the foot of the Andes Mountains and reaches to the Bolivian Amazon.
TIPNIS is located in the center of the country in the departments of Cochabamba and
Beni. Residing in this territory are indigenous Yuracaré, Chimaàn and Mojeño, a group of
communities totaling around 90,000 people (Farell 2012). Plans to build a highway
through the territories initiated in 2003 during Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada’s second term
in office. Mobilization on the issue among men and women from the three different ancestral groups occupying the TIPNIS region began in 2006. Objections intensified in 2010 when Evo Morales promulgated Law 005, which approved the protocol of financing the highway between Brazil and Bolivia. This took place after the granting of the land titles in the TIPNIS region after the 2009 changes to land reform (Echazú 2011; Saucedo 2012; L. Press 2012). The largest of numerous protests, marches, and demonstrations were the VIII and IX Marches of the Indigenous, both taking place between August 2011 and April 2012. According to news reports, around 400 indigenous women representing 34 villages in the east, Chaco, and the Amazon, began marching in August 2011 with the elderly, children, and pregnant family members included in the procession (Saucedo 2012; L. Press 2012; FFLA 2011). Between April and June 2012, at least 1000 marchers, the majority of them women, led another march from the lowlands to La Paz, this time with over 300 children accompanying family members (Achtenberg 2012; Chavez 2012a). Both marches were highly publicized in national and international media. While this was a positive factor for the coverage of activists’ issues, it also brought criticisms from NGOs like UNICEF and government ministries who feared health risks due to the exposure of children to the harsh Bolivian winter (Achtenberg 2012; Achtenberg 2012b). Indigenous protesters argued against the highway plans on two major constitutional grounds: Article 30, guaranteeing indigenous rights to be consulted on state decisions regarding their territories, and Article 347, which promotes the mitigation of environmental damage (Farell 2011). Indigenous women’s participation in the fight for the TIPNIS territory has been well documented in news sources, with indigenous women making use of gendered, environmental and cultural/ethnic frames—citing ancestral
respect and respect for their descendants--that affect their roles as women (Achtenberg 2012a.) Mariana Guasania, the Secretary of Gender for the Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of Bolivia (CIDOB), sums the basic frames of the movement: “the reality of indigenous women in eastern Bolivia is distinct because we live and feel the defense of our habitat and the natural resources that sustain our families” (Erbol 2012).

Networking for indigenous women also suffered in the TIPNIS cause. In 2011, the Organization of American States agreed to mediate a discussion over the conflict, and convened a meeting with cocaleros, commercial interests, and municipal authorities, but excluded the sub-central TIPNIS groups, which were the most vocal in opposing highway construction on cultural and ecological grounds (Echazú 2011). This exclusion prompted further protest, and exposed various divisions within the indigenous movement as a whole. Also, at the end of December of 2011 the Indigenous Council of the South (CONISUR), representing some TIPNIS communities, marched in favor of the highway’s construction, as they argued it would help provide the benefits of development, including easier access to healthcare and education (L. Press 2012). This division within the indigenous reached its highest display in clashes with pro-Morales protesters throughout the conflict.

In spite of the structural changes in government after the Gas War, political opportunity structures have been closed to TIPNIS organizers. This is evidenced by numerous publicized statements by various members of the cabinet and the president, who repeatedly discredited activist claims and publicly campaigned for the alternate goal for the purposes of economic and infrastructure development (Osorio 2011; Melendres 2012). Two laws have been passed regarding the TIPNIS territory, the first a law that
halted construction on and protected the territory (Law 180) and, two months later, a law which referred the matter of consultation on the highway to referendum (Law 222). Today, plans for the highway are in progress, as the consultation referendum returned a vote in favor of consulting the indigenous groups before construction began. The plans supposedly hinged on whether or not a majority of indigenous groups approved of the highway plans, in accordance with constitutional consultation rights. Indigenous activists were opposed to this measure, as they felt the government would manipulate the consultation process. The results of the consultation results are seemingly in favor of the TIPNIS highway, as the government claims that 47 out of 48 of the groups consulted have signed on to the highway construction. Yet, TIPNIS activists state that 52 communities reject both the road and the consultation process, leaving the outcome hotly disputed (Achtenberg 2012a). On October 6, 2012, Morales signed a contract for the first segment of the highway, claiming that the process has properly observed constitutional indigenous rights (Achtenberg 2012, 2012a).

In September 2011, news reports depict a violent clash between police and protesters, with police firing on and detaining women along with their children (Alejo 2012; CIDOB 2012; Reuters 2011). Responsibility for the brutal reaction by police was placed on indigenous women for an event the previous day, wherein Foreign Minister David Choquehuanca was forced to lead indigenous women marchers through a police barricade set up to impede their progress to La Paz. The minister filed charges of kidnapping against 6 of the indigenous female activists, which were subsequently dropped for lack of evidence. In September of 2012, La Razon and CIDOB both report on an investigation opened by the executive branch to determine where the orders for the
violent activities of police in September 2011 had originated. Morales is quoted as saying that the National Police acted unilaterally, and that the executive branch did not order the brutal repression of indigenous rebellion (Alejo 2012; CIDOB 2012). This investigation is another reaction by the government to appease the lowland groups after the XIX Indigenous March encountered intense police and citizen opposition. However, repressive reprisals by police forces have occurred as recently as July of 2012 in La Paz (Corz 2012). While the overall state political opportunity structure is coded as very open, the state’s structural opportunities for TIPNIS women have largely been closed.

The international environment is highly supportive of indigenous women’s issues regarding the TIPNIS conflict, based on principles outlined in various international accords. TIPNIS activists have argued,

The failure to do prior consultation violates international agreements ratified by Bolivia such as the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and International Labor Organization Convention 169. (Kenner 2011)

The TIPNIS movement’s resort to invoking international law reflects the fact that international accords have a bearing on the issue of the TIPNIS activists’ claims. While these appeals to the ILO and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples have been made, the issue of highway construction through the national indigenous park and its outcomes are more directly affected by domestic influences.

The outcome of failure on the TIPNIS issue illustrates the importance of interaction between variables, especially networks and state political opportunity structures. With moderate amounts of human capital resources due to weak networks, and conflict with indigenous supporters of Evo Morales, TIPNIS women were unable to
influence policy in the direction they desired. The use of gendered, ethnic claims referenced earlier is also associated in this case with indigenous women’s failure, but this has much to do with the fact that state political opportunity structures were closed to TIPNIS women’s goals. The successful cases in this discussion highlight the role of networks within the government, combined with an open political opportunity structure, as important contributors of success. Conversely, indigenous women in the TIPNIS conflict show a lack of government and societal connections through networks and political opportunity structures. Finally, international forces are found to be supportive, but unable to influence indigenous women’s issues at the domestic level.

Table 3 presents the summarized findings of all cases and their outcomes.
Table 3: Summary of Independent and Dependent Variable Scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Organizational Variable Scores</th>
<th>State Variable Scores</th>
<th>International Variable Scores</th>
<th>DV Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Transition Period</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Gas (2003)</td>
<td>Resources: High</td>
<td>POS: Closed</td>
<td>Obstructive</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Frames: EGB</td>
<td>Neolib: Declining</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Frames: EGB</td>
<td>Neolib: Declining</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Post-Liberal Period</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Gas (2005-6)</td>
<td>Resources: Very High</td>
<td>POS: V. Open</td>
<td>Obstructive</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Frames: EGB</td>
<td>Neoliberalism: Weak</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Reform</td>
<td>Resources: Very High</td>
<td>POS: V. Open</td>
<td>Supportive</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Frames: EG</td>
<td>Neolib: Weak</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gas Subsidies</td>
<td>Resources: High</td>
<td>POS: P. Open</td>
<td>Obstructive</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Frames: EGB</td>
<td>Neolib: Weak</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIPNIS</td>
<td>Resources: Moderate</td>
<td>Closed</td>
<td>Supportive</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Frames: EG</td>
<td>Neolib: Weak</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*POS= Political Opportunity Structure  
*P. Open=Partially Open; V. Open=Very Open  
*Neolib=Neoliberalism  
*Broad, non-gendered frames (BNG); ethnic, gendered frames (EG); ethnic, broad, gendered frames (EBG/mixed); Broad, gendered frames (BG)

V. Discussion and Conclusions

A broader view of the cases reveals that combinations of certain variables are conducive to favorable policy outcomes for indigenous women. First, successful
outcomes result from high to very high amounts of organizational resources, partially to very open political opportunity structures, and international support. This evidence is provided in the case of land reform and the final phase of gas nationalization. Cases of failure result from the combination of international opposition, moderate to high resources, ethnic, gendered, broad frames, and closed political opportunity structures, as seen in the cases of the first two phases of gas nationalization and the TIPNIS resolution. The case that resulted in mixed outcomes—gas subsidies—reveals partially open political opportunity structures, obstructive, but inconsequential international influences, moderate to high amounts of resources, and gendered, ethnic, and broad frames.

When networks and women’s leadership in the movement are absent, bringing down the overall value of organizational resources, they achieve, at best, moderate outcomes when confronting closings or partial openings in political opportunity structure. This is seen in the cases of gas and food subsidy protests and the TIPNIS conflict, where women’s leadership was lacking or where significant networking issues arose. One conclusion to draw from this evidence is that only high to very high resources—and especially leadership and networks—combined with partially to very open political opportunity structures produce complete success within this sample of cases. This demonstrates the importance of organizational resources as well as political opportunity structures, which I address more fully below. As hypothesized, high amounts of resources matter but are not, by themselves, able to overcome closed or lukewarm administrations, as the TIPNIS and gas subsidies cases reveal. But no case achieved success without high amounts of resources (land reform in 2006 and gas nationalization); therefore high and very high resources seem necessary but not sufficient to achieve policy success.
Unexpectedly, movements’ use of gendered and ethnic frames met with success, while some ethnic and gendered claims met with failure, indicating that ethnic and gendered frames can meet with successful outcomes.

Political opportunity structure is an important guiding variable to the outcomes in this research. While the other variables exhibit a range of outcomes for any given level, political opportunity structures do not. Political opportunity structures seem to never produce success or mixed outcomes when they are closed. Only partially or very open political opportunity structures have the potential, under all combinations of variables, to produce favorable policy outcomes. Very open political opportunity structures are necessary for success, and the coupling of very open structures with very high amounts of resources may be sufficient for indigenous women to succeed in changing policy. This evidence aligns with the hypotheses that structures and resources would impact social movement success.

Weak neoliberalism is shown to be important, but it is not sufficient to produce favorable outcomes. In agreement with my hypotheses, strong, declining, and weak neoliberal scores are all associated with failures, while weak neoliberal scores are also associated with successes. In cases where neoliberal governments produced successful policy for indigenous women, they confronted partially or very open political opportunity structures and used high amounts of resources. However, where weak neoliberal governments confronted social movements with high amounts of resources, and closed political opportunity structures (TIPNIS, gas subsidies), social movements experienced failed and mixed outcomes.
Finally, international support or opposition is another highly contextualized variable in this research. International opposition contributes to failure under closed or partially open political opportunity structures in the nationalization of gas and TIPNIS cases. But international opposition was as strong in the final phase of the Gas War as it was in the previous phases, yet the final outcome was resolved against international preferences. This indicates that international influence requires the presence of other variables like the political opportunity structure (and declining neoliberal commitments) to register any impact on indigenous women’s policy outcomes.

This article has presented an overview of the variables across four policy arenas in Bolivia to periods to reveal which variables, and combinations of variables, have contributed to indigenous women’s policy influence. Future work should incorporate the theoretical framework supplied here for doubly and triply marginalized social movements in cross-national and cross-temporal context. In addition, social movements may gain practical knowledge from the discussion of how social movement resources need to combine with the right opportunity structures in order to be effective.

The preceding passages have analyzed the policy outcomes that accompany organizational, state, and international changes in Bolivia between 2003-2012. While indigenous women have not always gotten the policies they want in the post-liberal period, the changes in organizational and state characteristics witnessed during this era seem to provide more favorable conditions for policy success. The observations in this study indicate some support for the resources and state hypotheses, while leaving in question the exact role of frames of activism and international forces. In essence, high amounts of resources, weak neoliberal commitments and political opportunities are vital
components to creating success for indigenous women’s policy efforts. Most important among these are the state variables, particularly opening political opportunity structure.

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1. Were women able to amass significant resources for mobilization?
   *Resources.* Coding: Low, Moderate, High, Very High

2. Was there evidence of strong female leadership?
   *Resources.* Coding: Low, Moderate, High

3. Were frames and discourses consistent with broader public interests?
   *Frames.* Coding: Ethnic, Gendered, Broad, mixed (Ethnic/Gendered/Broad), mixed (Nonethnic/Non-gendered/Broad)

4. Did the state structure produce political openings for indigenous women?
   *Political Opportunity Structure.* Coding: Closed, Partially Open, Open, Very Open

5. Were indigenous women able to take advantage of political openings?

6. What factors of the international environment entered social movement discourses?
   *International Environment.* Coding: Obstructive, Supportive

7. Do social movement organizations show solidarity networks with other organizations or groups?
   *Resources.* Coding: Weak, Moderate, Strong.

8. Are social movements encouraged or discouraged by increasing or decreasing public support?
   *Resources.* Coding: Weak, Moderate, Strong.

9. Does neoliberalism moderate, hinder, or promote success of women in indigenous movement?
   *Neoliberalism.* Coding: Minimal, Declining, Strong

10. Do leftist qualities moderate, hinder, or promote success of women in indigenous movements?
11. Did the action taken by government address any specific claims made by IW?
   a. If action addressed IW claims, was it publicly cited as a response to IW?

   *Policy Outcome.* Successful, Mixed, Failed.

12. Did the action taken by government address non-indigenous issues supported by IW?

13. Was international influence a significant factor in IW claims and government response?
   a. Did actors reference globalization as a hindrance or an aid to their claims?
   b. Were lending conditions a hindrance to the claims of IW?
   c. Was international political influence cited as an important factor?
   d. Was international political influence a resource for IW?
   e. Was international political influence a topic of contention?
   f. Did international political organizations support or oppose government’s stance?
   g. Were international political accords a resource for IW

   *International Influence:* Coding: Obstructive, Moderate, Supportive.