Gender balancing, or policies enacted to ensure that traditionally masculine institutions—such as the security sector—include more women, is a pervasive aspect of international peace building, yet there is almost no rigorous theory or evidence addressing how such policies actually have an effect in improving citizen perceptions of those institutions. To address the theoretical and empirical gap, the paper builds a theory predicting when gender balancing in the domestic and international security sector may facilitate post-conflict stability through changed perceptions, and when it may not. Societal stereotypes about female peacefulness and about foreign peace building involvement mean that citizens are less likely to rely on the security sector if there is gender balancing, but only for international security sector forces such as peacekeeping, and not for domestic forces such as the police. The article finds supportive evidence for the theory from original surveys conducted in post-conflict Liberia.
Introduction

Gender balancing,\(^1\) or policies enacted to ensure that political and security institutions include more women, is a pervasive aspect of international policy making that reaches a broad range of international issue areas such as security sector reform (SSR), international trade\(^2\) and climate change.\(^3\) Nowhere has gender balancing been more salient than in UN policy toward post-conflict reconstruction. The UN Security Council has endorsed gender balancing in a number of resolutions, commencing with Resolution 1325 (2000) (UNSC 1325) and continuing with Resolutions 1820, 1888, 1889, 1960, and 2122, as a way to promote women’s participation and rights in post-conflict countries. Due to the influence of UNSC 1325 and subsequent resolutions, gender balancing in both the international and domestic security sectors has become a standard pillar in international efforts to reform the security sector in post-conflict countries.\(^4\)

With sixty eight peacekeeping missions since 1948 and fifteen current peacekeeping operations, and an increase in the number of female peacekeepers in all missions since 2006,\(^5\) it is important to take into consideration how contact with foreign and local women affect perceptions, as women have become more involved in security provision. The recent trend in promoting such initiatives in post-conflict countries is motivated by the idea that women are effective at peace building.\(^6\) The effectiveness

\(^1\) Gender is a social construction and gender is not synonymous with women. However, gender balancing policies mean including more women (or men) in order to balance the numbers. I use gender to refer to the social construction of different masculinities and femininities, but gender balancing to refer to a change in the sex of an institution.

\(^2\) See: UNCTAD 2009

\(^3\) See Dankelman 2010

\(^4\) See DCAF 2011

\(^5\) See: AUTHOR

\(^6\) See: Gizelis 2009, 2011
argument provides the basis for some proponents of gender balancing to argue that including more women in all areas of politics will improve the image of and policymaking in domestic and international institutions.  

Yet, despite the broad implementation of gender balancing policies, there is no rigorous theory or empirical evidence suggesting the conditions under which gender balancing efforts actually improve perceptions of institutions. This article begins to fill the gap by developing an original theory that answers the question: how do gender balancing policies affect post-conflict perceptions of international and domestic security forces? The article specifically focuses on improving perception of the security forces, because one of the main arguments for including women in the security sector suggests that they improve the image of the security sector and this in turn may be the first step to increase civilian confidence in the government after a war. The theory predicts that gender essentialisms affect perceptions toward the security sector, and that involvement of foreign and local female security personnel in peace building affect individual preferences about security provision differentially. In contrast to the current literature that suggests that gender balancing helps legitimize peacekeeping missions the study theorizes and finds that contact with women, especially local women, in the security forces leads people to reject security provision by foreigners and opt for more security

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7 The study uses gender essentialisms in the same way that much of the American politics literature uses it. It refers to the pervasive and remarkably uniform perception of differences in traits ascribed to men and women, given the considerable agreement across a large number of psychological studies that a typical woman is seen as warm, gentle, kind, and passive, whereas a typical man is viewed as tough, aggressive, and assertive. (Dolan 2004; Huddy and Terkildsen 1993, Koch 2000; Lawless 2004). Throughout this article, when I refer to gender essentialism, I do not condone essentialism, but merely argue that people’s perceptions largely conform to essentialisms of men and women.

8 Bridges and Horsfall 2009; DeGroot 2001; Kronsell 2012; Olsson and Truggestad 2001; Olsson 2009
provision by local security forces.

The study uses Liberia as a case study to understand how gender balancing affects civilian perceptions toward the security sector. Liberia’s civil war ended in a negotiated settlement in 2003 with the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) sent to enforce the peace. The security sector in Liberia includes the Liberian National Police (LNP) and the UNMI peacekeeping mission, who are the two entities responsible for the country’s internal security. Liberia represents the ideal test case for a study on gender balancing, because nowhere has gender balancing been more highly visible in both UNMIL and in the LNP. The LNP mandates a 20% and 30% quota for women in 2008 and 2012 respectively and UNMIL includes the first all-female formed police unit deployed to a peacekeeping mission in 2007.

In order to test the theory, the study includes a representative survey of residents in two of Monrovia’s ex-combatant and internally displaced communities—areas where the baseline mistrust of government security forces is likely to be high. Specifically, the survey is designed to solicit information about contact with women in the security sector, with either or both the local LNP women and female peacekeepers. It assesses whether contact affects residents’ perceptions towards women’s engagement in security provision and their perception toward LNP and UNMIL response to security provision. The results are consistent with the theory.

**Background on Gender Balancing and Security Sector Reform**

Gender balancing policies are enacted in order to increase the number of women in traditionally masculine institutions such as political or security institutions. It is a way
to help equalize men’s and women’s participation in a given institution and is conceptualized as the degree to which women and men participate in the full range of activities associated with the institution. Balancing usually occurs through quotas or policy changes that encourage women’s (or men’s) participation in the institution.

In 2000, UNSC 1325 formally institutionalized gender balancing policies by mandating greater representation of women in all peacekeeping operations, and advocated gender balancing not only to reduce inequality, but also to promote international peace and security. Through UNSC 1325 and subsequent resolutions, gender balancing has become a central component of peacekeeping and peace building operations worldwide and of international interventions in developing countries more generally.

Since UNSC 1325, the UN has sought to enhance the operational effectiveness of its peacekeeping missions through increasing the number of women in missions. Moreover, the international community has invested resources into gender balancing domestic security forces as a form of SSR. The Sierra Leone police developed family support units and have recruited women to fill these posts. The Policía Nacional de Timor-Leste (PNTL) required a 20% quota and the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) targeted women and ethnic minorities in recruitment and trained officers in counter human trafficking measures. These international and domestic efforts to gender balance

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9 Mazurana, Raven-Roberts, and Parpart 2005
10 DCAF 2011
11 Bush 2011; Cox and Inoguchi 2003; Youngs 2004
12 Bridges and Horsfall 2009; Kronsell 2012; Mazurana, Raven-Roberts, and Parpart 2005; Simic 2010
13 Other countries in the report where gender has been a major part of SSR include: Hungary, South Africa, the UK, Central African Republic, Indonesia, Peru, Somalia,
represent the international community’s commitment to ensuring that women play a role in post-conflict security.

Gender balancing as a mode of SSR is nested within a larger movement in the international community to promote good governance reforms in war torn countries. SSR helps ensure enduring peace after a civil conflict.\textsuperscript{14} In the 1990s, the international development community incorporated SSR as a part of a “good governance” agenda where accountability, transparency, and representation in security sector became the primary objective.\textsuperscript{15} The new focus was on transforming security bodies into more transparent and professional organizations. The focus also included fostering a cultural transformation in the security sector whereby previously excluded groups, such as ethnic minorities and women, were included to build civilian confidence in the government.\textsuperscript{16} Thus, SSR in a post-conflict country has focused on reforming the police, military, defense ministries, and other domestic security forces so that civilians do not perceive the security sector as an abusive or corrupt institution, but rather a professional sector capable of providing security to the population.

In an international context, reforms to peacekeeping missions to be more transparent and accountable are also considered an important part of the larger goal to enhance mission legitimacy. Since the Brahmi Report in 2000, the UN has taken active measures to improve its mission capacity and image. For example, the UN specifically included a conduct and discipline unit to ensure that peacekeepers who abused the local

Afghanistan, Russia, Tajikistan, Rwanda, Ivory Coast, Israel, Jamaica, Brazil, and Nepal. Since the publication of the report, the US has committed to integrate women into combat roles in its armed forces (DCAF 2011).

\textsuperscript{14} Toft 2010
\textsuperscript{15} Anderlini and Conaway, 2004
\textsuperscript{16} Anderlini and Conaway 2004; Brzoska 2006
population would be held accountable. The UN argues that reforming both peacekeeping missions and local security apparatus is essential to peace building because it rebuilds confidence between the state and its people, and according to some proponents, gender balancing as a reform helps fulfill these goals.

**Security Sector Perceptions**

Security sector reform as a part of peace building efforts rely on changing perceptions. Social psychologists have long argued that there is a direct link between perceptions and changed behavior. When individuals change their perceptions to be more positive toward an institution, then it is more likely that this will lead to more confidence in and support for the institution.

Civilians in war torn countries often have a negative view of the security sector and the negative perceptions undoubtedly influence the likelihood of trusting the security sector for services. This is because there is a deficit of trust in the police and military after a war. The security sector may have been implicated in atrocities, as former combatants and perpetrators are incorporated into government positions. Comments from survivors demonstrate how difficult it is for people to discern whether the security sector will protect the populations: “how can we be expected to believe that men in the uniform of our new government will protect us when so many of them were themselves our

19 See: Ajzen and Madden 1986; Chartrand and Bargh 1999; Dijksterhuis and van Knippenberg 1998; Weinstein and Nicolich 1993
20 Goldsmith 2005; Weitzer 1995
Moreover, a post-conflict setting is often characterized by corruption of the security services, excessive military spending, lack of professionalism, and poor oversight, which also contribute to a trust deficit among the local population.22

In such a context, reforms are designed to change these negative perceptions so that civilians start to develop more confidence in the government. As perceptions change, it is possible that behavior will change as well. When citizens find the formal security sector trustworthy, they may be more likely to defer to the institution’s decisions and rules, and follow them voluntarily out of obligation rather than out of fear of punishment or anticipation of reward.23 They may be more willing to report crimes, provide intelligence or information, and may even decide to incur individual costs for the government—such as pay taxes in support of domestic institutions or even join the security forces themselves.

Importantly for post conflict stability, positive perceptions may lead civilians to not side with rebels and resort to violence as a means to solve societal problems. The more confidence individuals have in the formal security sector, the less they may rely on informal option to resolve disputes, and the more difficult it may be for rebels to recruit civilians. As such, changing perceptions is the first step to changing behavior that could be harmful to the state. Even when perceptions may not directly change behavior toward institutions, improving governmental perceptions is important in assessing people’s attitude about the post-conflict environment. As such, assessing the effect of reforms on perceptions of the government is the subject of several recent, prominent studies on post-

21 Rehn and Sirleaf 2002: 117
22 Goldsmith 2005; Weitzer 1995
23 Jost and Major 2001; Tyler 2006
conflict stability.\textsuperscript{24}

In many post-conflict environments, there is a lot of uncertainty about whether the new security forces will act in a conciliatory manner and uncertainty about the intentions of a peacekeeping mission. In such a low information environment, civilians need cues or signals about the type of security sector with which they are engaging. One simple way to signal the type of security sector is to change the security forces’ outward appearance. Previous studies on policing demonstrate that the outward appearance of the officer is particularly important in how civilians perceive the police,\textsuperscript{25} and that contact with police affects people’s perceptions.\textsuperscript{26} For example, in ethnically divided societies, or where violence between the state and civilians has been especially severe, the composition of the security force acts as a symbol so that minority groups feel safe to use the state’s security services.\textsuperscript{27} In this sense, simple contact with police can have an effect on changing perceptions, because the cues signal a reformed security sector.

Analogously, women directly change the outward appearance of the security forces. Women may serve as a signal in a low information environment, when there is uncertainty about whether to trust security forces.\textsuperscript{28} The integration of women can serve as a signal for a more approachable security force, because it is more representative of the larger population. As people engage with women in the security sector, their perception towards security forces may become more favorable because they associate women (and subsequently favorable feminine qualities) with the security sector. Meir argues that in

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\textsuperscript{24} See: Beath, Christia, and Enikolopov 2013; Blattman, Hartman, and Blair 2013
\textsuperscript{25} Hasisi and Weitzer 2007
\textsuperscript{26} Bordua and Tifft 1971; Brown and Benedict 2002
\textsuperscript{27} Hasisi and Weitzer 2007; R. Weitzer and Hasisi 2008
\textsuperscript{28} McDermott 1997; Sapiro 1981
the context of bureaucracies, citizens change their perceptions specifically because of people’s demographic characteristics, as people are more reassured by people that look like them.\textsuperscript{29} This idea that the outward physical appearance of the security forces can shape perceptions is important for understanding how contact with women, particularly local women, may influence people’s preferences for security sector response.

\textbf{Theoretical Foundations for Gender Balancing and Security Sector Perceptions}

Three factors play a role in analyzing the impact of women’s integration into the security forces on security sector perceptions. First, as current studies suggest, gender essentialisms may influence the degree to which civilians prefer women and security forces with women in them to respond to particular security concerns. Second, contact with foreign versus local security forces may have differential effects on perceptions, as local women signal SSR while foreign women do not. Third, the gendered nature of the security response is of particular importance. For example, most security sector responses, such as combat roles, protecting the population during armed conflict or riots, are considered to be masculine. In contrast, women may be considered better suited for more feminine roles such as addressing sexual and gender based violence (SGBV).

\textit{Gender essentialisms}

In much of the discussion for promoting gender balancing policies in the security sector (and other areas of policymaking), the justification for gender balancing rest on gender essentialisms—the association of “men and women with mutually exclusive and

\textsuperscript{29} Keiser et al. 2002; Meier and Hawes 2009; Meier and Nicholson-Crotty 2006
oppositional attributes.”\textsuperscript{30} Gender refers to the socially and culturally expected behavior of men and women based on roles, attitudes, and values that are ascribed to them by their sex and greatly affects people’s perceptions about how women and men should behave.\textsuperscript{31}

Currently, gender essentialisms or variations of the argument provide the only explanation for why gender balancing may enhance the perception of security forces, particularly of peacekeeping missions.

The gender essentialisms explanation for gender balancing effects suggests that adding women to institution may enhance mission effectiveness in two ways. First, it may “gender” the institution so that it embodies more highly desired feminine qualities.\textsuperscript{32}

Women are assumed to be kinder and more peaceful than men;\textsuperscript{33} and thus including women in security forces is expected to make interactions with civilians more collaborative and less argumentative, and may ensure that the policy processes and outcomes are sensitive to women’s issues and needs.\textsuperscript{34} As women are integrated into the security sector, the security sector becomes more “feminine.”

Gender essentialisms in the security forces may be particularly important because the security sector privileges masculine characteristics—combat, aggression, conformity, and discipline over more feminine approaches to conflict resolution.\textsuperscript{35} While some argue that “militarized masculinity” may be important for combat effectiveness,\textsuperscript{36} peacekeeping, peace-building, and security sector reform, as a part of a new “post-________

\textsuperscript{30} Carpenter 2005: 296
\textsuperscript{31} Cockburn 1999
\textsuperscript{32} DeGroot 2001; Kronsell 2012
\textsuperscript{33} ibid
\textsuperscript{34} Huddy and Terkildsen 1993a, 1993b
\textsuperscript{35} Stiehm 1989; Goldstein 2001
\textsuperscript{36} Fenner and deYoung 2001; Maginnis 2013; Gutmann 2000, Febbraro and McCann 2003
national defense,” do not require the same combat mentality, and in many cases such “militarized masculinity” may be harmful to the overall goals of post-conflict peace building. Instead, feminine qualities may be more valued in peace building missions. Where once conciliatory traits that served as justification to keep women out of the security sector and away from combat positions—because they were seen as a disruption to combat effectiveness—are now used as a justification to include women in the security sector, because they are seen as particularly important for increasing civilian support. Peacekeeping—considered to be a more “feminine” activity than combat—thus benefits by women’s integration. These essentialist claims have long been contested in the feminist international relations literature, but remain the driving force behind many gender balancing policies globally.

Second, adding women to a predominantly male dominated security sector may enhance operational effectiveness, because the inclusion of women allows the security sector to interact with, gather intelligence from, and provide services to local women

37 See: Kronsell 2012; Whitworth 2007; Shepherd 2008. The negative effects of such “militarized masculinity” are documented in a number of feminist studies (Simic 2009, 2010; Enloe 2000, 2007).
38 DeGroot 2001
39 See: Carreiras 2006; Cohn 2013; Sjoberg and Via 2010
41 Kronsell 2012; Olsson and Truggestad 2001; Olsson 2009
Indeed, the UN argues that the inclusion of female peacekeepers allows the mission to address the specific needs of female ex-combatants during the process of demobilizing and reintegration into civilian life; help make the peacekeeping force approachable to women in the community, help interview survivors of gender-based violence; mentor female cadets at police and military academies; and interact with women in societies where women are prohibited from speaking to men. Here, women make the mission more approachable to all members of society.

As such, the current assumption is that when women are included in peacekeeping or domestic security sector, they may improve the legitimacy of the security forces.\textsuperscript{42} Civilians may adopt a more positive view of security forces, because they may perceive women as able to change the mission culture, de-escalate a crisis situation, resolve conflicts peacefully, or because they may view the security sector as more accessible, especially to women’s needs.

\textit{Local versus international security forces}

Gender essentialisms may not apply uniformly to all women. There is reason to believe that the ideas about women “applying a feminine touch” to the security sector may not apply to foreign women because foreign women may not be seen as sensitive to the gender roles and hierarchies in the host society, and may have an ambiguous gender status in the host country. As such, gender essentialisms may only apply to local women. Additionally, given that visible domestic reforms serve as a signal to the population about a changed domestic security sector, the protection role of the

\textsuperscript{42} Olsson and Truggestad 2001; Olsson 2009; Bridges and Horsfall 2009; Kronsell 2012
international forces may become obsolete. Thus, contact with women in the security
forces may lead individuals to prefer local women and domestic security forces to
respond to security concerns but not female peacekeepers or the peacekeeping mission.

The current literature on female peacekeepers suggests that they help to legitimize
the mission. This suggestion relies on the assumption that locals perceive foreign women
the same way as they do local women; that both are encompassed within the category of
“women,” and both can “feminize” the security forces. However, as many have argued,
generalizing women’s experiences into one category is highly problematic.43 This is
especially the case among women from different countries. Women’s experiences are
drastically different based on country, race, ethnicity, class, religion, and many other
factors. Thus, locals may perceive foreign women as different to local women. As such,
they may not ascribe feminine characteristics to the peacekeeping mission, given that
foreign women’s experiences are vastly different from local women’s experiences. For
example, one implication of gender essentialism is that female peacekeepers can help
interview survivors of SGBV. However, it is possible that local women may not trust
foreign women with their story, because female peacekeepers may not be perceived as
empathetic to the local gender context. Rather, local women may be more willing to
report SGBV to other local women who understand the local context and traditional
gender roles.

Additionally, Foreign women may have an ambiguous gender status in the host
country. Locals apply different social standards to foreign women.44 For example,
foreign women may be able to interact with local men in a culture where local men and

43 Crenshaw 1991; Reingold 2000, 2008
44 Loftsdóttir 2002; Moore 1994
women do not interact with each other. At the same time foreign women have more leeway in interactions with men, they may not be valued in the same way as local women, because they do not abide by traditional gender norms and hierarchies; and as such, they may not be wholly considered “feminine” within the local context. Thus, the different standards that locals apply to foreign women are not congruent with gender essentialisms and may disrupt the process by which women are supposed to legitimize the peacekeeping mission. Moreover, in carrying out their duties, foreign women may exert power over local men, which disrupts traditional authority, and may cause resentment among the populace. In this way, female peacekeepers may not be seen as women holding particular skills and characteristics that help legitimize the peacekeeping mission, but rather as responsible for challenging and changing gender hierarchies in society. The implication is that the interaction with female peacekeepers may actually lead to reluctance for female peacekeepers and the peacekeeping mission to handle security issues.

While interaction with female peacekeepers may lead to a general reluctance for foreigners to handle security issues, interaction with local women may signal a reformed security sector—a security sector that includes a “feminine” touch. Gender essentialism is more likely to apply to domestic female personnel because local women understand the local gender context and more closely conform to the host society’s interpretation of what it means to be a woman. When the public interact with local women, they are more likely to ascribe feminine characteristics to the security sector, because the gender status of local women is not ambiguous relative to the gender status of foreign women.
Women in the domestic security forces are a visible manifestation of a reformed security sector. Due to the visible nature of gender balancing reforms over other types of reforms, such as anti-corruption measures, the public observes the implementation of the reform. Civilians observe that their contact with the security sector is with women, implying a change in the security sector from a security sector previously perceived as abusive and violent to one that has now adopted more feminine traits. The observation renders the international mission less important in providing protection, as the conclusion people may draw is that the peacekeeping mission has done its job to reform the domestic security sector and is no longer needed to provide protection. In its place, the local security forces are ready to handle security, because they have reformed. Thus, gender balancing may serve to enhance local support for domestic security forces but render international protection obsolete.

The above analysis suggests that gender balancing in domestic security forces may have a positive effect on enhancing perceptions for local security forces, but not necessarily for international forces. And, female peacekeepers do not necessarily enhance the mission’s legitimacy because their gender role may be ambiguous or even threatening to locals. Thus, we would expect that contact with women in the security sector both with local and foreign women lead to people not preferring female peacekeepers or UNMIL to respond to security concerns. We would also expect that contact specifically with women in the local security forces lead people to not prefer female peacekeepers or UNMIL to respond to security concerns, but instead prefer the domestic security sector to respond to security issues.

*H1a: Contact with women in the security sector will lead people to not prefer female peacekeepers or UNMIL to respond to security concerns.*
**H1b:** Contact with women in the security sector will lead people to prefer female LNP or the LNP to respond to security concerns.

**H1c:** Contact with local women in the security sector will lead to civilians not preferring female peacekeepers and UNMIL to respond to security concerns.

**H1d:** Contact with local women in the security sector will lead to civilians to prefer female LNP or the LNP to respond to security concerns.

Yet, female peacekeepers may play a role in legitimizing local women’s participation in the security forces. As locals observe foreign women engaging in security provision, this may help legitimize security roles for local women by demonstrating that local women can provide security as well. While foreign women may have an ambiguous gender role—meaning that people may not prefer their assistance in security—they may instead provide an example to the local population that local women can provide security.

Once foreign women provide an example, civilians may not only accept local women as security providers, but may come to prefer them to foreign women. People may prefer local women as security providers, because they still embody what it means to be a “woman” in the host society, but may not accept foreign women, because foreign women hold a more ambiguous status. In other words, when people have contact with female peacekeepers, they prefer local women to provide security, because in general local women may still abide by traditional gender norms and embody the feminine qualities necessary for a more approachable security force. In contrast, foreign women demonstrate that local women can provide security, but they do not fit traditional gender norms, rendering their services superfluous.
The presence of the first all female formed police unit in 2007 in UNMIL provides an ideal example of this mechanism. The Indian female peacekeepers from the unit are publicly visible in Monrovia carrying their weapons, guarding the presidential palace, and providing security during riots. As Liberians have observed the Indian women providing protection daily and during crisis situations, the idea of women providing protection and responding to riots may have become normalized. Locals may have learned to recognize that Liberian women have the capacity to help in riot situations and to provide security just as the Indian women do. However, given the preference between the Indian women and LNP women to handle security situations, Liberians may prefer LNP women because local women understand the local context more so than the Indian women. Such analysis is corroborated in interviews with members of the all-female formed police unit in which the women state that local women hardly ever ask them to address security issues, but rather frequently speak to them about inspiring them to be more empowered.45

Moreover, the visible presence of international women in the security sector may actually lead local women to invest in the security sector by joining it.46 In fact, The UN argues that the all-female Indian FPU served as “an incentive and an attraction” to Liberian women to join the Liberian National Police.47 Early reports and anecdotal evidence suggest that their presence in Liberia has helped to bring Liberian women out

45 I conducted interviews with 13 female peacekeepers from the unit, including the contingent leader in June 2012.
46 Kronsell 2012; Olsson 2009
47 See: “All female UN squad a success” 2007,
into the public, both to register complaints and to join the Liberian police service.\(^\text{48}\)

Thus, the visibility of foreign women may inspire Liberian women to join the LNP.

The above analysis suggests that foreign women serve as an example to local women when it comes to security provision, but that they do not necessarily enhance the image of the peacekeeping mission. As Liberians observe foreign women participate in security, they start to prefer that local women play a role in security as well. This leads to the following set of hypotheses:

\textit{H2a: Contact with female peacekeepers will lead to civilians to not prefer female peacekeepers or UNMIL to respond to security concerns.}

\textit{H2b: Contact with female peacekeepers will lead to civilians preferring local women and the LNP to respond to security concerns.}

\textit{H2c: Contact with female peacekeepers, will lead to local women being inspired to join the security forces.}

\textit{Gendered security sector responses}

In addition to domestic and international gender balancing, it is also important to consider the different types of security sector responses and how they may condition perceptions. The different roles in the security sector are often gendered. Some security responses such as protecting civilians from violence or engaging in combat may be “masculine” in nature, whereas responding to sexual and gender based violence (SGBV) may be a “feminine” task.

\(^{48}\) For example, the effect on Liberian women was reported to be significant and almost immediate: the number of women applying to join the LNP tripled from approximately 120 to 350 in the two months after the arrival of the first FPU. Ambassador Shirin Tahir-Kheli, Senior Advisor to the U.S. Secretary of State for Women's Empowerment, interviewed by Better World Campaign in “Female Peacekeepers in Liberia,” [online video] <http://www.betterworldcampaign.org/issues/peacekeeping/female-peacekeepers-in-liberia.html> Retrieved May 10, 2012.
One area where policymakers assume women have a comparative advantage is in addressing SGBV. Meier and Crotty found that the reporting of sexual assault increased because women felt more comfortable reporting SGBV crimes to other female police officers.\(^{49}\) Moreover, UNSC Resolution 2106 (2013) explicitly states that women can exert “influence over parties to armed conflict with respect to addressing sexual violence.” Indeed, the high rate of sexual violence in Liberia (both perpetrated by peacekeepers and by Liberians) is one reason why UNMIL has placed high priority on recruiting more females in the Liberian National Police. The LNP says it hopes to improve its responses to SGBV by recruiting more women into the LNP to handle cases related to sexual abuse and domestic violence.\(^{50}\)

In contrast to handling SGBV, security roles related to the protection of civilians and combat may be “masculine” in nature. If women are perceived to be less aggressive than men, civilians may assume that they are not capable of handling violent situations such as security provision, riots, or armed violence. Protections from violence is still considered a predominantly masculine task, and there is still the widely held view that women are programmed for a caring role and cannot therefore summon the aggressive impulses necessary for effective security provision.\(^{51}\) In fact, much of the debate about

\(^{49}\) Meier and Nicholson-Crotty 2006  
\(^{50}\) See: “Liberian National Police Seeks More Female Recruits”  
\(^{51}\) DeGroot 2001; Hoffman and Hickey 2005; Love and Singer 1988; Boyce and Herd 2003; Carreiras 2006; Chrisler and McCreary 2010; Goldstein 2003; Herrnson, Lay, and Stokes 2003; Williams and Best 1990
women in combat has focused on whether women could handle violence.\textsuperscript{52} This implies that individuals may perceive men as better able to provide security than women; and thus, individuals may not want women to respond to security issues related to the protection of civilians.

If we account for the gendered nature of different roles within the security sector, we get more nuanced predictions. Given the above discussion that gender essentialisms may only apply to women in local security forces and not necessarily to female peacekeepers, we would expect that contact with local women would lead individuals to prefer local women and domestic security institutions to respond to SGBV. In contrast, contact with local women would lead to individuals not preferring local women or the domestic security sector to respond to protecting civilians, responding to riots or to armed violence. This leads to the following hypotheses:

\textit{H3a: Increased contact with local women in the security sector, will lead civilians to prefer women and the security sector to respond to rape and domestic violence.}

\textit{H3b: Increased contact with local women in the security sector will lead civilians to not prefer women and the security sector to respond to general security, riots and armed violence.}

To summarize, there are three sets of hypotheses that predict people’s perceptions toward the security sector based on interacting with women. In the first set of hypotheses, interacting with women in the security forces and local women in particular may lead to people preferring women in the domestic security sector to respond to security concerns, but nor prefer international security forces and women in them to respond to security concerns. In the second set of hypotheses, we expect that contact

\textsuperscript{52} Michaels 2013; Fenner and deYoung 2001; MacCoun, Kier, and Belkin 2006; Quester 1977
with female peacekeepers will lead people to prefer domestic security sector services and reject international security forces in responding to security concerns. In the last set of hypotheses, given that the nature of security response is gendered, we would expect contact with local women to lead to people preferring local women and domestic security forces to respond to rape and domestic violence, but not prefer local women and domestic security forces to respond to armed violence, riots, and security provision.

**Research Design**

The study conceptualizes gender balancing as a change in the demographic composition of the institution aimed at reaching out to a broader segment of the population. It specifically operationalizes gender balancing in Liberia as individual exposure to women, given the mandated increase in the number of women in both the peacekeeping mission and the LNP.

In order to test the hypotheses, the study includes a representative survey in two communities with high levels of ex-combatants and internally displaced people (IDPs) in Monrovia, Liberia: Peace Island and West Point. Both communities have been and are continually threatened by the possibility of large-scale eviction by the government, and they both rely heavily on informal means of dispute resolution. By choosing communities with high levels of ex-combatant and internally displaced people, the hypotheses are tested on individuals who are likely to have low baseline trust in the government.

The two communities were chosen in order to get variation in exposure to female security forces—individuals who are exposed to women, who are likely to be exposed to
women, and who are not exposed to women.\textsuperscript{53} West Point contains the headquarters for the Zone 2 Police Station, and Peace Island does not have a police station.\textsuperscript{54} Thus, the two communities were matched on eighteen different dimensions to ensure that they were similar in all respects except for contact with security personnel. In West Point, people have statistically significant more contact with security personnel—both peacekeepers and LNP.\textsuperscript{55} This ensures variation in individual contact with the security sector, and thus variation in contact with women in the security sector. Matching also ensures that individuals are the unit of analysis without having to control for a number of community-level variables. Table 1 demonstrates the key characteristics of the two communities based on difference of means tests.\textsuperscript{56} West Point residents have lived in their community longer than Peace Island residents, and more Peace Island community members

\textsuperscript{53} During the selection of communities for the survey, the enumerators were consulted to come up with a list of informal communities that had police stations and ones that did not. They only came up with one community with a police station: West Point. They could not collectively come up with another community other than Peace Island that was similar with respect to informality, crime, and ex-combatants/IDPs to match West Point.

\textsuperscript{54} There are 9 police zones in Monrovia. The exact location of LNP stations within zones is determined by the availability of land. However, the divisions of the zones are dependent on the population and crime rates.

\textsuperscript{55} There are more peacekeepers in communities with police stations, because the job of UNPOL is to train LNP officers, and they make daily trips to the police stations.

\textsuperscript{56} I conducted a chi-squared test of independence for education level, number of children, type of job, relationship status, and in what counties they previously lived. There is statistically significant difference for Bong, Nimba, Sinoe, Grand Krue, and Grand Bassa Counties. More people in Peace Island have lived in Bong and Nimba Counties, whereas more people from West Point have lived in Sinoe, Grand Krue, and Grand Bassa Counties. However, theoretically, regional differences don’t co-vary with the independent and dependent variables in the study. We also find that there is a difference in the type of jobs. More people in West Point rely on fishing for a living than in Peace Island. Because this is most likely a function of West Point’s location (on the beach) and because there is no theoretical reason to assume that fishermen have strong preferences toward security or women over other professions, it is not included as a control in the model. Moreover, when jobs are removed, the communities are statistically insignificant. Thus, we can conclude that the two communities are similar in most respects except for contact with the security sector.
participated in the war. While there are some differences between the communities, as
highlighted below in the table, they are often compared to one another.\textsuperscript{57}

\textit{<Insert Table 1>}

\textit{Sampling}

The survey design uses a cross-sectional random cluster survey of 649 adults, aged 18 years or older, in the two communities West Point (345 adults) and Peace Island (304 adults). For both communities, the study divided up the communities into zones marked by GPS coordinates (in Peace Island, zones of 136,604 square feet and in West Point zones of 25,091 square feet), and then randomly sampled 25 zones from West Point and 34 zones in Peace Island based on the populations of each community.\textsuperscript{58} Using GPS devices, the enumerators located the zones and counted the number of houses within each randomly selected zone. They then randomly selected houses within those zones, and within the houses, they randomly selected an individual to interview. Non-response was not an issue because enumerators returned to the houses until the randomly selected person was available for an interview. The data were then aggregated and reformatted for the study.\textsuperscript{59}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{58} See Appendix D
\textsuperscript{59} Ipods and isurvey program transferred the data onto a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. However, because I had two surveys conducted separately, I had to merge the respondents to each other from the two different surveys based on the zone and household code. Because the initial survey included a number of questions on dispute resolution, health, and other factors, I created a new spreadsheet with the variables of
\end{flushleft}
Selected interview participants were first screened to determine their involvement in some form of a dispute (property, debt, loving or relationships problems, child support, rape, beating or domestic violence, abuse of authority, killing, and labor). The theory above is premised on the nature of contact between civilians and security forces being professional. That is, capturing family relationships, friendships, or other formal or informal relationships between security forces and civilians is not relevant to the study. Such contact undoubtedly affects perceptions toward the security sector; but understanding whether the interactions based on LNP and UNMIL officers’ performance of their job (resolving disputes) affect perceptions is more relevant to the theory. Consequently sampling from a population of individuals who have experienced a dispute allows the theory to be applied to the set of individuals appropriate for the study—as those who have experienced a dispute are more likely to contact the security forces for help. Respondents who were involved in a dispute in the past 12 months completed a main survey, involving questions about dispute resolution, the security sector, health, and perceptions about government institutions. In total, 291 respondents in both communities completed both surveys (135 from Peace Island and 156 from West Point).

interest for my study. Then, I excluded the respondents who did not have a dispute because they did not go on to take the main survey, which included questions about the security sector. The result is a spreadsheet of only individuals who have been involved in a dispute.  

The types of disputes on which to screen were chosen based on consultation with the Carter Center, our enumerators, and focus groups in the community.
One concern may be that self-reporting may not yield the most accurate responses.\textsuperscript{61} While self-reporting may be problematic, the study took several precautions to ensure that the respondents answered as honestly as possible. The study hired and trained six Liberian enumerators of both sexes, who had previous experience conducting surveys. The enumerators ensured that the questions were culturally appropriate and written colloquially. The survey was designed over a two-month period and implemented over the course of two weeks. Enumerators conducted a pilot test of the questions to ensure the validity of the questions. Surveys were administered via iPods, allowing data to be uploaded through the iSurvey application software. Village elders gave permission for the study, which ensured that people trusted the enumerators.

\textit{Variables}

For the dependent variable, measuring people’s perceptions entails more than simply asking people to identify whether they think the security sector is helpful or not. A better way to gauge people’s perceptions about the security sector is to ask about individual level reliance on the security sector and about what would make them participate in such institutions. This better measures people’s level of confidence in the security sector, because they get at positive and negative perceptions indirectly.

Survey questions asked people which security organizations they preferred for responding to security provision, armed violence, riot, rape, and domestic violence (beating). Ten options were offered and respondents were allowed to select more than

\textsuperscript{61} Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001
If people answered that they wanted UNMIL/LNP or female LNP/UNMIL to respond, it was coded as a one and all other answers were coded as a zero, making the variable dichotomous. Another survey question asked about why people would like to join the security sector. There were twelve different options. If either women in the UNMIL mission or LNP inspired them to want to join the security sector, this answer was coded as a one and all other answers were coded as zero.

There are four main independent variables: simple contact with women whether a female peacekeeper, female LNP officer, or a female Women and Children Protection Officer (a part of the LNP), in-depth contact with women measured continuously, and dichotomous indicators for contact with a female peacekeeper or female LNP, and dichotomous indicators for whether the contact with the female peacekeeper or female LNP led to that female handling the case.

In-depth contact is measured based on simple contact with women in all the three security bodies and whether those women handled the case. For example, a person who scored the maximum of six on the scale had contact with a female peacekeepers who took

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62 These included: AFL, Police, UNMIL, Religious Leader, Liberian NGO, International NGO, Women’s Group, Council of Elders, Judicial System, Township Commissioner/Community Watch, Other. These options are based off of focus group answers about where people seek protection.

63 These include: seeing UNMIL female officers, seeing female LNP officers, to gain respect, for the pay, childhood dream, having family in the LNP, sacrifice to country, to help people, for the excitement, to feel empowered, and for a stable career. It is unlikely that the people were primed to answer this way because the questions about joining were preceded by questions about peacekeeping, which have nothing to do with gender or joining the security sector. Moreover, the answers for each question were randomized, so they did not appear in any specific order each time someone answered them.

64 The Women and Children Protection Unit (WCPU) is a branch of the LNP, but they have their own stations a part from the LNP station.

65 For all contact variables, when people answered that they did not know, I coded it as a 0. The reason for this is because if people could not recall whether they had contact or not, then it is not likely to affect their perceptions.
the case, with a LNP female officer who also took the case, and a WCPU female who also took the case. To test how contact with female peacekeepers or female LNP affect perceptions, the models include dummy variables for whether individuals had contact with a female peacekeeper/LNP officer and a dummy for whether the female peacekeeper/LNP officer handled the case. The latter is a higher threshold because it assumes that the female handled the individual’s case and not just simple contact. In general, individuals had a lot more contact with female LNP than with female peacekeepers. This means that there will be a lot more variance in the models that test the effects of female peacekeeper contact. Nevertheless, some models do find relationships when there is contact with female peacekeepers.

The model includes nine control variables. First, it includes a control for the amount of contact individuals have had with UNMIL and the LNP. Second, because time spent living in the community and participation in the armed conflict were different between the two communities, they are included as controls. Previous literature suggests that sex and age may affect security sector perceptions, so the model includes them. Moreover, the model includes a control for feelings about UNMIL, because people may not have uniform beliefs about UNMIL. It also includes a control for the number of disputes people have experienced and people’s beliefs about traditional (not formal) dispute resolution mechanisms. Lastly, it includes a measure of people’s perceptions of women’s rights. The women’s rights score is an aggregate score based on nine different

66 I did also disaggregate whether contact with the WCPU women yielded results, but they are insignificant but consistent with the LNP women findings.
67 There are 27 cases of contact with female peacekeepers and 13 cases of female peacekeepers taking the case. This means that contact with female peacekeepers is still very rare despite the push to increase female peacekeeping. In contrast, there are 91 cases of contact with female LNP and 59 instances where the female LNP handled the case.
questions about the rights of women, which are added together. Higher numbers indicate that that the individual is more knowledgeable about women’s rights.  

Models

A logit model is used to test the hypotheses. As robustness checks, matching analysis at the individual level on eight different dimensions was employed, assuming that the “treatment” was contact with women, which was coded as a dichotomous variable. The model yielded similar results as below. For each hypothesis, different model specifications were tested by systematically removing each control variable resulting in nine different models for each result. The model using nine control variables is displayed below. The substantive results are presented using simulation to generate confidence intervals. Only robust results are presented, but the significant, but not robust results are mentioned and included in the tables.

Results

To test the first set of hypotheses—that contact with women will lead people to prefer females in the LNP or the LNP to respond to security concerns, but not prefer female peacekeepers and UNMIL to respond to security concerns, we first look at how simple contact—a dichotomous variable for whether people have had contact with female

\[\text{A table of all the variables is found in Appendix B. And, a description of the survey questions is found in Appendix C.}\]

\[\text{I use both a matching research design and individual matching analysis. For the matching analysis, I use Coarsened Exact matching. See: Iacus, King, and Porro 2012}\]

\[\text{I started out with 282 observations and after matching, there were 102 matched observations. These results are available upon request.}\]

\[\text{All tables are in Appendix A}\]
security personnel or not—affects perceptions. Table 2 presents the significant results for simple contact with women. They are robust to all model specifications.

<Insert Table 2>

The relationship between simple contact with women and preferring female peacekeeper and UNMIL to respond is consistently negative: when people have contact with women in the security sector, they do not prefer female peacekeepers or the peacekeeping mission to respond to security concerns. Notably, the relationship remains negative regardless of the security concern—whether it is rape and domestic violence or riots, armed violence and general security. This provides support for hypothesis 1a—contact with women in the security sector will lead people to not prefer female peacekeepers or UNMIL to respond to security concerns. Additionally, when individuals have simple contact with a female, they are more likely to prefer the LNP to respond to security concerns and armed conflict. This supports hypothesis 1b—contact with women in the security sector will lead people to prefer female LNP or the LNP to respond to security concerns. The only exception to the theory is that simple contact with women leads people to not prefer the LNP to respond to domestic violence, but the effect turns positive when the contact is only with female LNP (see below).

Moving to in-depth contact (the amount of contact on a continuous scale), there is a similar pattern. Figure 1 represent the substantive results for in-depth contact and individual preferences for responses to domestic violence, armed violence, and riot. All models are robust to different model specifications. For armed conflict and domestic
violence, when people have increased, in-depth contact with women in the security forces, they are less likely to want female peacekeepers to respond. For armed conflict and riots, when people have increased, in-depth contact with women, they are less likely to prefer UNMIL to respond. Again, there is a negative relationship between the amount of contact with women and preferring UNMIL or female peacekeepers to respond to all different types of security concerns. The graphs provide evidence for hypothesis 1a.

Additionally, in support of hypothesis 1b, there is a significant, positive relationship between in-depth contact with women and people preferring the LNP to provide security (results not shown). However, the results are not robust to different model specifications.

Next, hypotheses 1c suggests that there is a negative relationship between contact with local, female LNP and preferring female peacekeepers and UNMIL to respond to security concerns. Table 3 provides support for this hypothesis. When individuals have contact with female LNP officers, they do not prefer UNMIL nor female peacekeepers to respond to security concerns—whether rape and domestic violence or general security, riots and armed violence. It is important to note that the threshold for rejecting UNMIL is higher than for female peacekeepers. Civilians rejected UNMIL assistance to provide security, respond to armed conflict and riots only when local LNP women handled the

72 See Appendix A
case. However, civilians rejected assistance from female peacekeepers merely when they had contact with female LNP.

Moreover, hypothesis 1d suggests that contact with female LNP will lead civilians to prefer female LNP or the LNP to respond to security concerns. Table 4 provides evidence for this hypothesis. In general, when individuals have contact with female LNP, they prefer the LNP to respond to general security and armed conflict, and female LNP officers to respond to rape and domestic violence. Here, it is important to note that the threshold for preferring female LNP is higher than for the LNP. Only when female LNP handled cases, did people prefer female LNP to respond to rape and domestic violence. But, simple contact with LNP females led people to prefer the LNP to provide security and respond to armed conflict.

In general there is minimal support for the second set of hypotheses about contact with female peacekeepers and security sector perceptions. Hypothesis 2a suggests that contact with female peacekeepers will lead civilians to not prefer female peacekeepers or UNMIL to respond to security concerns. There is no evidence for this hypothesis (See Table 5). In fact, on two occasions—response to armed conflict and rape—contact with
female peacekeepers or female peacekeeper handling of a case led to a positive relationship. However, the findings are not robust to different model specifications.

<Insert Table 5>

There is some support for hypothesis 2b—contact with female peacekeepers will lead to civilians preferring local women and the LNP to respond to security concerns. When people have contact with female peacekeepers, they are more likely to want female LNP to respond to riots (Table 6). Contact with female peacekeepers also increases the likelihood for people preferring the LNP to respond to riots, but the results were not robust (results not shown).\textsuperscript{73} For both riot results, contact with female peacekeepers was sufficient to yield results; female peacekeepers did not need to handle a case in order to observe a change in preferences.

<Insert Table 6>

There is no support for hypothesis 2c—contact with female peacekeepers will lead to local women being inspired to join the security forces.\textsuperscript{74} However, while contact with female peacekeepers and being inspired to join is insignificant, there is a robust, positive relationship between in-depth contact with women in the security sector and

\textsuperscript{73} See Appendix A
\textsuperscript{74} For the hypothesis about inspiring women to join, the sample is sub-set to include only women, because the theory suggests that only women will be inspired to join by other women. This leads to 249 observations. I also run a logit for both men and women and get the same result. And, as expected, there is no significant result for sub-setting the sample to only men.
being inspired to join (Figure 2), and a robust relationship between contact with local 
women and being inspired to join. The lack of significance between contact with female 
peacekeepers and local women being inspired to join the security forces could be due to 
the few cases where women have contact with female peacekeepers. There are seventeen 
cases where Liberian women had contact with a female peacekeeper, and ten cases where 
the female peacekeeper took the case. In contrast, there are sixty-one cases of women 
having contact with female LNP and forty-one cases where the female LNP handled the 
case.

Nevertheless, contact with women does make a difference. Women are more 
likely to say that they were inspired to join the security sector if they met a lot of female 
security officers and if they met local female LNP officers. The results suggest that, 
holding variables at their constants, moving from no exposure to maximum exposure may 
lead to a sixty-one percent increase in the likelihood of being inspired to join the security 
sector due to the presence of other women in the security sector. Thus, while female 
peacekeepers may not inspire women to join the security forces, contact with a lot of 
women in the security sector and contact with local women may inspire local women to 
join the security sector.

<Insert Figure 2>

Recall that the third set of hypotheses is about the gendered nature of security 
issues. Hypothesis 3a suggests that increased contact with local women in the security 
sector will lead civilians to prefer local women and the security sector to respond to rape
and domestic violence. In contrast, hypothesis 3b suggests that contact with local women in the security sector will lead civilians to not prefer local women and the domestic security sector to respond to security concerns such as general security, riots, and armed violence. Table 4 provides some evidence for these hypotheses. When people had contact with female LNP, they preferred that female LNP to respond to gendered security issues such as rape and domestic violence. However, they preferred the LNP, not female LNP, to respond to more masculine security issues such as general security provision and armed conflict. Contact with female LNP and people preferring the LNP to respond to riots was also positive and significant, but not robust to different model specifications (results now shown). This means that when it comes to different security concerns, the gendered nature of them may affect whether people want local women to respond or not, but it does not mean that people reject local female response or local response to the more “masculine” security issues. Instead, it may suggest that contact with female LNP encourages people to keep gender roles in the local security sector segregated, where local women handle “feminine issues” and local men handle “masculine issues.”

**Results for control variables**

While it is outside the scope of the study to analyze the effects of the control variable, they offer more insight into the factors that influence people’s perceptions about the security sector. When people have positive views about UNMIL, they are more likely to prefer female peacekeepers and UNMIL to provide security and respond to armed violence and riots. Positive views about UNMIL also translate to preferring the

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75 See Appendix A
LNP to respond to riots. However, the more disputes people experience, the less they want LNP to provide security and respond to riots, and the less they want female LNP to respond to riots and to domestic violence. The longer people live in their community, the less they want the LNP to provide security and respond to armed violence, but the more they wanted female peacekeepers to respond to armed conflict and riots and UNMIL to respond to domestic violence. And, the older people are, the less they want female peacekeepers to respond to armed violence and riots and UNMIL to respond to domestic violence.

Moreover, the more contact people have with the security sector in general, the less they want the LNP to respond to riots, rape and domestic violence, and female LNP to respond to riots, rape, and domestic violence. When respondents were involved in an armed group during the war, they were less likely to prefer female LNP to respond to rape. And, the more people knew about women’s rights, the less they wanted LNP to respond to armed violence, but the more they wanted female LNP to respond to rape, UNMIL to respond to rape, and female peacekeepers and LNP to respond to domestic violence.

Discussion

In general, there is most support for the first set of hypotheses: contact with women in the security forces, especially local women, lead people to rely on domestic security institutions to handle security concerns, but not international security institutions. This provides support for the signaling mechanism whereby gender balancing policies indicate to the local population that the security sector is reformed. As such, the
implementation of gender balancing in the domestic security sector renders protection by international peacekeeping missions obsolete. The implication is that gender balancing polices may have the effect of legitimizing domestic security forces, but not international ones. It is possible that other visible reforms that portray the security sector as more accessible and less abusive, such as ethnic balancing or disarmament may have a similar effect. As the population observes a visible change in the security sector that makes it more moderate, they may gain more confidence in the domestic security sector while relying less on international forces for protection.

There is minimal support for the second set of hypotheses. Contact with female peacekeepers helps legitimize local women’s participation in the security sector, but only for riots. Given that in Monrovia, the most visible presence of female peacekeepers is the all-female Indian FPU, who is charged with the responsibility of responding to riots, their example may have helped improve the image of local women’s ability to handle riots. Because Liberians may not have observed female peacekeepers in other security roles such as responding to armed conflict, the public may not yet perceive local females as capable of handling those other roles.

There is no consistent evidence that contact with female peacekeepers leads people to reject female peacekeepers or UNMIL response to security concerns. This suggests that the presence of female peacekeeper does not lead to backlash due to their possible role in reconfiguring gender hierarchies in the host society. The general null results also provide some evidence against the mainstream literature that suggests that female peacekeepers help legitimate missions.
Moreover, contrary to much of the UN’s claim that female peacekeepers have inspired local women to join the security forces, in general the local population has little contact with female peacekeepers suggesting that they are not the main actors that have helped inspire local women. Rather, local women have made a difference in inspiring women to join the security forces. When women are exposed to local women, they are more likely to say that are inspired to join the security forces. Additionally, the more women are exposed to women in the security forces, the more likely they are to be inspired to join the security forces. This suggests that both local and foreign women may help improve perceptions about the local security force.

Lastly, there is some evidence that individuals prefer local women for some security tasks to others. When individuals had contact with female LNP, they were more likely to prefer female LNP to respond to rape and domestic violence (feminine tasks) and prefer the LNP (not female LNP) to provide general security and respond to armed violence (masculine tasks). Contrary to the hypothesis, however, there is no evidence that respondents rejected female LNP and LNP response to traditionally masculine security roles when they had contact with local women. This means that when individuals have contact with local women, they prefer local women to handle issues of SGBV, and local men to handle issues of security and armed violence, while rejecting UNMIL and female peacekeeper involvement in these issues.

Some scholars have suggested that women’s participation in the civil war may have helped normalize women’s role in security provision. However, the analysis here suggests that civilians prefer women in the security sector to address gendered issues;

76 Utas 2005; Coulter, Persson, and Utas 2008
they preferred that female LNP handle SGBV, and not provide protection. However, interaction with foreign women actually enhanced people’s preferences for local women providing protection during riots, not interaction with local women themselves. This means that while it is possible that the war has helped break down traditional gender roles, in the security sector, interactions with foreign women may have particularly helped improve people’s perceptions of local women’s ability to participate in traditionally masculine security roles such as responding to riots.

The empirical evidence in the study can only be generalized to the two communities in Monrovia. Nevertheless, the study provides a novel theory on gender balancing policies and how they affect local perceptions. The theory can be applied generally, and the empirical analysis provides one test of the theory. The theory and empirical analysis suggest that gender balancing is more nuanced than policymakers and some scholars portray it. While other scholars and policymakers have suggested and found some modest support that female peacekeepers enhance mission legitimacy, the evidence here suggests that it is important to take both domestic and international gender balancing policies into account when analyzing the effects of gender balancing.

**Conclusion**

The theory and empirical findings provide a more nuanced analysis of gender balancing than the current literature. The study theorizes and finds support for the idea that domestic gender balancing policies lead people to prefer local women to handle issues of SGBV and the local security institution to handle traditional masculine security issues, while decreasing people’s preferences for the female peacekeepers and
peacekeeping mission to respond to security concerns in general. In some cases, international gender balancing policies serve to legitimize local women’s role in the security sector.

While many have argued that gender balancing may help legitimize peacekeeping missions the theory and evidence here demonstrates that gender balancing actually helps enhance perceptions about the local, domestic security sector, and not necessarily the peacekeeping mission. The study demonstrates the importance of distinguishing between domestic and international gender balancing reforms in analyzing their impact on civilian perceptions. And, it also demonstrates that gender essentialisms may not apply to all women in influencing people’s perceptions about women’s role in security. Such revisions to the gender essentialism theory improve our understanding of gender balancing effects on the local perception of the security sector.

The findings have broad policy implications. In Monrovia, if gender balancing policies have led people to rely more on domestic institutions than the international security apparatus, then gender balancing the LNP has helped prepare the country for UNMIL’s departure. Indeed, given that the UNMIL mission is scheduled to depart in 2015, gender balancing policies may have helped prepare for UNMIL’s departure by helping to legitimize the local security forces. The implication is that in other countries with peacekeeping missions, gender balancing the domestic security sector could help pave the way for missions to leave.

There is remarkably little theorizing and empirical analysis about how women’s participation in the security forces affects civilian attitudes and behavior. This study is a

77 Bridges and Horsfall 2009; Kronsell 2012; Olsson and Truggestad 2001; Olsson 2009
first step in addressing this gap in the literature. In general, more work is needed to understand how gender balancing affects civilian and security sector behavior. In other words, when individuals have contact with female security forces, do they then contact the security forces more frequently? The theory here suggests they should contact the security sector more. Additionally, more work is needed to understand how gender balancing affects the group dynamics within the security sector itself. Does the integration of women hamper operational effectiveness as some have suggested, or does it improve relations among male and female security personnel? These questions are vitally important given the rapid increase in gender balancing polices globally.
References


Table 1: Community Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community Characteristic</th>
<th>Peace Island</th>
<th>West Point</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean Age</td>
<td>33.98</td>
<td>34.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Years Lived in Community*</td>
<td>4.05 years</td>
<td>14.2 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can Read</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Number in HH</td>
<td>5.875</td>
<td>5.951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Number of Children in HH</td>
<td>2.24</td>
<td>2.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly Individual Income</td>
<td>$53/month</td>
<td>$57/month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Had a dispute</td>
<td>49.8%</td>
<td>48.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in an Armed Group*</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Know someone raped during the war</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saw someone get killed during the war</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experienced Abuse by Authority</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favor fighting to resolve a conflict</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact with LNP*</td>
<td>42.8%</td>
<td>51.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact with UNMIL*</td>
<td>35.9%</td>
<td>48.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Statistically significant
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preference for Responder</th>
<th>No contact with women</th>
<th>Contact with women</th>
<th>Percent change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNMIL female responds to rape</td>
<td>0.62 (0.53-0.70)</td>
<td>0.45 (0.33-0.58)</td>
<td>-16.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIL responds to rape</td>
<td>0.59 (0.5-0.68)</td>
<td>0.37 (0.26-0.5)</td>
<td>-22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIL female responds to domestic violence</td>
<td>0.53 (0.44-0.62)</td>
<td>0.28 (0.18-0.4)</td>
<td>-25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIL female responds to general security</td>
<td>0.48 (0.39-0.57)</td>
<td>0.25 (0.17-0.38)</td>
<td>-23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIL female responds to armed conflict</td>
<td>0.56 (0.47-0.65)</td>
<td>0.34 (0.23-0.48)</td>
<td>-21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIL provide security</td>
<td>0.74 (0.8-0.65)</td>
<td>0.56 (0.68-0.42)</td>
<td>-17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LNP female responds to domestic violence</td>
<td>0.86 (0.8-0.91)</td>
<td>0.73 (0.6-0.82)</td>
<td>-13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LNP provide security</td>
<td>0.91 (0.85-0.95)</td>
<td>0.98 (0.93-0.99)</td>
<td>+7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LNP respond to armed conflict</td>
<td>0.82 (0.73-0.87)</td>
<td>0.96 (0.9-0.98)</td>
<td>+14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preference for Responder</td>
<td>No contact with LNP female</td>
<td>Contact with LNP female</td>
<td>Percent change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIL female provide security</td>
<td>0.47 (0.38-0.56)</td>
<td>0.21 (0.17-0.43)</td>
<td>-26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIL provides security</td>
<td>0.74 (0.67-0.81)</td>
<td>0.39 (0.5-0.78)</td>
<td>-35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIL female respond to armed conflict</td>
<td>0.56 (0.47-0.64)</td>
<td>0.25 (0.23-0.52)</td>
<td>-31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIL responds to armed conflict</td>
<td>0.89 (0.83-0.93)</td>
<td>0.68 (0.46-0.84)</td>
<td>-21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIL responds to riot</td>
<td>0.90 (0.84-0.93)</td>
<td>0.67 (0.48-0.83)</td>
<td>-23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female UNMIL responds to rape</td>
<td>0.62 (0.53-0.69)</td>
<td>0.42 (0.26-0.53)</td>
<td>-20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIL respond to rape</td>
<td>0.59 (0.52-0.67)</td>
<td>0.27 (0.25-0.52)</td>
<td>-32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female UNMIL responds to domestic violence</td>
<td>0.52 (0.44-0.60)</td>
<td>0.25 (0.15-0.40)</td>
<td>-27%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4: Substantive effects for contact with female LNP and preferred response by domestic security forces (90% CI)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preference for Responder</th>
<th>No contact with LNP female</th>
<th>Contact with LNP female</th>
<th>Percent change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LNP provide security</td>
<td>0.91 (0.85-0.95)</td>
<td>0.98 (0.95-0.99)</td>
<td>+7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LNP respond to armed conflict</td>
<td>0.84 (0.75-0.89)</td>
<td>0.96 (0.93-0.99)</td>
<td>+12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LNP female respond to rape</td>
<td>0.83 (0.75-0.88)</td>
<td>0.93 (0.83-0.96)</td>
<td>+10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LNP female respond to domestic violence</td>
<td>0.82 (0.75-0.87)</td>
<td>0.94 (0.86-0.97)</td>
<td>+12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>Female peacekeeper responds to general security</td>
<td>UNMIL responds to general security</td>
<td>Female peacekeeper responds to armed conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-0.48 (0.92)</td>
<td>0.40 (0.89)</td>
<td>-0.23 (0.86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact with female peacekeeper</td>
<td>0.46 (0.58)</td>
<td>0.29 (0.59)</td>
<td>1.04* (0.61)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female peacekeeper hears the case</td>
<td>-0.04 (0.69)</td>
<td>1.22 (0.80)</td>
<td>-1.09 (0.72)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Contact</td>
<td>-0.07 (0.06)</td>
<td>-0.13** (0.06)</td>
<td>-0.08 (0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in armed group</td>
<td>-0.27 (0.28)</td>
<td>0.29 (0.28)</td>
<td>-0.14 (0.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.27 (0.27)</td>
<td>0.31 (0.27)</td>
<td>-0.16 (0.27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years lived in Community</td>
<td>0.0006 (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.009 (0.01)</td>
<td>0.04*** (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.003 (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.03* (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional Leader</td>
<td>0.002 (0.006)</td>
<td>0.003 (0.006)</td>
<td>0.007 (0.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Rights</td>
<td>-0.05 (0.08)</td>
<td>-0.13 (0.09)</td>
<td>-0.03 (0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispute Number</td>
<td>-0.12 (0.13)</td>
<td>-0.07 (0.12)</td>
<td>-0.09 (0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIL good</td>
<td>1.60** (0.50)</td>
<td>1.46*** (0.37)</td>
<td>1.28*** (0.41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>373.34</td>
<td>377.02</td>
<td>386.39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6: *Substantive effects for contact with female peacekeeper and preferred response (90% CI)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preference for Responder</th>
<th>No contact with female peacekeeper</th>
<th>Contact with female peacekeeper</th>
<th>Percent change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female LNP respond to riots</td>
<td>0.59 (0.51-0.66)</td>
<td>0.91 (0.67-0.93)</td>
<td>+31%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Word Count: 11,003

Word Count with Appendix A-D: 13,548
Appendix A: Tables

Table 1: Prefer female peacekeepers to provide general security (in-depth contact), N=291 (for tables 1-30)

| Estimate  | Std. Error | z value | Pr(>|z|) |
|-----------|------------|---------|----------|
| (Intercept) | -0.6026 | 0.9204 | -0.65 | 0.5126 |
| FemContactScore | -0.1387 | 0.1325 | -1.05 | 0.2951 |
| SecurityContact | 0.0243 | 0.0768 | 0.32 | 0.7515 |
| ArmedGroup | -0.2627 | 0.2773 | -0.95 | 0.3435 |
| Female | -0.2795 | 0.2735 | -1.02 | 0.3067 |
| Live | -0.0002 | 0.0137 | -0.01 | 0.9979 |
| Age | -0.0178 | 0.0143 | -1.24 | 0.2135 |
| TradLeader | 0.0022 | 0.0058 | 0.38 | 0.7055 |
| WomensRights | -0.0426 | 0.0828 | -0.51 | 0.6070 |
| Dispute | -0.1416 | 0.1287 | -1.10 | 0.2714 |
| UNMILgood | 1.6477 | 0.4984 | 3.31 | 0.0009 |

Table 2: Prefer female peacekeepers to provide general security (contact with female LNP)

| Estimate  | Std. Error | z value | Pr(>|z|) |
|-----------|------------|---------|----------|
| (Intercept) | -0.5690 | 0.9259 | -0.61 | 0.5389 |
| FemContactLNP | -0.8068 | 0.4325 | -1.87 | 0.0621 |
| FemLNPTakeCase | -0.4150 | 0.4204 | -0.99 | 0.3224 |
| SecurityContact | 0.0959 | 0.0714 | 1.34 | 0.1791 |
| ArmedGroup | -0.2787 | 0.2824 | -0.99 | 0.3238 |
| Female | -0.2808 | 0.2788 | -1.01 | 0.3138 |
| Live | -0.0032 | 0.0139 | -0.23 | 0.8172 |
| Age | -0.0189 | 0.0144 | -1.31 | 0.1908 |
| TradLeader | 0.0045 | 0.0060 | 0.75 | 0.4515 |
| WomensRights | -0.0300 | 0.0845 | -0.35 | 0.7227 |
| Dispute | -0.1515 | 0.1288 | -1.18 | 0.2398 |
| UNMILgood | 1.6117 | 0.5022 | 3.21 | 0.0013 |

Table 3: Prefer UNMIL to provide general security (simple contact with women)

| Estimate  | Std. Error | z value | Pr(>|z|) |
|-----------|------------|---------|----------|
| (Intercept) | 0.4725 | 0.8894 | 0.53 | 0.5952 |
| FemContact | -0.7799 | 0.3895 | -2.00 | 0.0453 |
| SecurityContact | 0.0372 | 0.0738 | 0.50 | 0.6140 |
| ArmedGroup | 0.2902 | 0.2758 | 1.05 | 0.2927 |
| Female | 0.2949 | 0.2714 | 1.09 | 0.2772 |
| Live | -0.0161 | 0.0135 | -1.19 | 0.2338 |
| Age | -0.0023 | 0.0139 | -0.16 | 0.8708 |
| TradLeader | 0.0041 | 0.0061 | 0.67 | 0.5025 |
| WomensRights | -0.1250 | 0.0857 | -1.46 | 0.1449 |
| Dispute | -0.1196 | 0.1206 | -0.99 | 0.3212 |
| UNMILgood | 1.4658 | 0.3686 | 3.98 | 0.0001 |
## Table 4: Prefer UNMIL to provide general security (contact with female LNP)

| Estimate | Std. Error | z value | Pr(>|z|) |
|----------|------------|---------|---------|
| (Intercept) | 0.1798 | 0.8985 | 0.20 | 0.8414 |
| FemContactLNP | -0.4072 | 0.4189 | -0.97 | 0.3310 |
| FemLNPTakeCase | -1.1002 | 0.3979 | -2.77 | 0.0057 |
| SecurityContact | 0.0674 | 0.0737 | 0.91 | 0.3604 |
| ArmedGroup | 0.3096 | 0.2803 | 1.10 | 0.2693 |
| Female | 0.3947 | 0.2786 | 1.42 | 0.1565 |
| Live | -0.0166 | 0.0138 | -1.21 | 0.2265 |
| Age | -0.0040 | 0.0142 | -0.29 | 0.7751 |
| TradLeader | -0.0070 | 0.0063 | 1.11 | 0.2652 |
| WomensRights | -0.0937 | 0.0870 | -1.08 | 0.2815 |
| Dispute | -0.1210 | 0.1211 | -1.00 | 0.3180 |
| UNMILgood | 1.4908 | 0.3721 | 4.01 | 0.0001 |

## Table 5: Prefer LNP to provide general security (in-depth contact with women)

| Estimate | Std. Error | z value | Pr(>|z|) |
|----------|------------|---------|---------|
| (Intercept) | 2.3795 | 1.2892 | 1.85 | 0.0649 |
| FemContactScore | 0.5056 | 0.2895 | 1.75 | 0.0807 |
| SecurityContact | -0.0530 | 0.1336 | -0.40 | 0.6915 |
| ArmedGroup | 0.0255 | 0.4424 | 0.06 | 0.9541 |
| Female | -0.2299 | 0.4668 | -0.49 | 0.6223 |
| Live | -0.0507 | 0.0205 | -2.47 | 0.0135 |
| Age | 0.0141 | 0.0245 | 0.57 | 0.5667 |
| TradLeader | -0.0127 | 0.0085 | -1.49 | 0.1353 |
| WomensRights | 0.1937 | 0.1266 | 1.53 | 0.1259 |
| Dispute | -0.6041 | 0.1733 | -3.49 | 0.0005 |
| UNMILgood | -0.2161 | 0.6107 | -0.35 | 0.7234 |

## Table 6: Prefer LNP to provide general security (simple contact with women)

| Estimate | Std. Error | z value | Pr(>|z|) |
|----------|------------|---------|---------|
| (Intercept) | 2.1817 | 1.2786 | 1.71 | 0.0879 |
| FemContact | 1.3639 | 0.7483 | 1.82 | 0.0683 |
| SecurityContact | -0.0601 | 0.1358 | -0.44 | 0.6581 |
| ArmedGroup | 0.0463 | 0.4480 | 0.10 | 0.9177 |
| Female | -0.1661 | 0.4709 | -0.35 | 0.7243 |
| Live | -0.0489 | 0.0204 | -2.40 | 0.0162 |
| Age | 0.0127 | 0.0244 | 0.52 | 0.6023 |
| TradLeader | -0.0124 | 0.0086 | -1.45 | 0.1467 |
| WomensRights | 0.1995 | 0.1269 | 1.57 | 0.1158 |
| Dispute | -0.5967 | 0.1732 | -3.44 | 0.0006 |
| UNMILgood | -0.1473 | 0.6161 | -0.24 | 0.8110 |
Table 7: Prefer LNP to provide general security (contact with female LNP)

| Term            | Estimate | Std. Error | z value | Pr(>|z|) |
|-----------------|----------|------------|---------|---------|
| (Intercept)     | 2.1972   | 1.2804     | 1.72    | 0.0862  |
| FemContactLNP   | 2.1597   | 0.8648     | 2.50    | 0.0125  |
| FemLNPTakeCase  | -0.5637  | 0.7979     | -0.71   | 0.4799  |
| SecurityContact | -0.0727  | 0.1221     | -0.60   | 0.5517  |
| ArmedGroup      | 0.1090   | 0.4618     | 0.24    | 0.8135  |
| Female          | -0.2022  | 0.4792     | -0.42   | 0.6731  |
| Live            | -0.0480  | 0.0204     | -2.35   | 0.0189  |
| Age             | 0.0147   | 0.0248     | 0.60    | 0.5518  |
| TradLeader      | 0.0097   | 0.0204     | -2.35   | 0.0189  |
| WomensRights    | 0.1949   | 0.1289     | 1.51    | 0.1306  |
| Dispute         | -0.0193  | 0.1746     | -3.55   | 0.0004  |
| UNMILgood       | 0.0797   | 0.6174     | -0.13   | 0.8973  |

Table 8: Prefer female peacekeepers to respond to armed conflict (in-depth contact)

| Term            | Estimate | Std. Error | z value | Pr(>|z|) |
|-----------------|----------|------------|---------|---------|
| (Intercept)     | -0.3974  | 0.8643     | -0.46   | 0.6457  |
| FemContactScore | -0.2216  | 0.1305     | -1.70   | 0.0890  |
| SecurityContact | 0.0571   | 0.0759     | 0.75    | 0.4520  |
| ArmedGroup      | -0.1540  | 0.2643     | -0.58   | 0.5600  |
| Female          | -0.1737  | 0.2675     | -0.65   | 0.5161  |
| Live            | 0.0411   | 0.0135     | 3.04    | 0.0024  |
| Age             | -0.0256  | 0.0140     | -1.83   | 0.0678  |
| TradLeader      | 0.0099   | 0.0059     | 1.17    | 0.2433  |
| WomensRights    | -0.0218  | 0.0810     | -0.27   | 0.7875  |
| Dispute         | -0.1086  | 0.1234     | -0.88   | 0.3788  |
| UNMILgood       | 1.3585   | 0.4997     | 3.32    | 0.0009  |

Table 9: Prefer female peacekeepers to respond to armed conflict (simple contact)

| Term            | Estimate | Std. Error | z value | Pr(>|z|) |
|-----------------|----------|------------|---------|---------|
| (Intercept)     | -0.1965  | 0.8660     | -0.23   | 0.8176  |
| FemContact      | -0.8765  | 0.3968     | -2.21   | 0.0272  |
| SecurityContact | 0.0816   | 0.0745     | 1.10    | 0.2732  |
| ArmedGroup      | -0.1528  | 0.2656     | -0.58   | 0.5653  |
| Female          | -0.2030  | 0.2680     | -0.76   | 0.4488  |
| Live            | 0.0390   | 0.0136     | 2.86    | 0.0042  |
| Age             | -0.0247  | 0.0141     | -1.76   | 0.0791  |
| TradLeader      | 0.0076   | 0.0060     | 1.28    | 0.2014  |
| WomensRights    | -0.0292  | 0.0811     | -0.36   | 0.7185  |
| Dispute         | -0.1130  | 0.1231     | -0.92   | 0.3588  |
| UNMILgood       | 1.2934   | 0.4119     | 3.14    | 0.0017  |
Table 10: Prefer female peacekeepers to respond to armed conflict (contact with female LNP)

|                  | Estimate | Std. Error | z value | Pr(>|z|) |
|------------------|----------|------------|---------|----------|
| (Intercept)      | -0.3601  | 0.8699     | -0.41   | 0.6789   |
| FemContactLNP    | -0.7754  | 0.4160     | -1.86   | 0.0623   |
| FemLNPTakeCase   | -0.5683  | 0.4018     | -1.41   | 0.1573   |
| SecurityContact  | 0.1016   | 0.0719     | 1.41    | 0.1580   |
| ArmedGroup       | -0.1642  | 0.2692     | -0.61   | 0.5418   |
| Female           | -0.1582  | 0.2716     | -0.58   | 0.5604   |
| Live             | 0.0398   | 0.0137     | 2.91    | 0.0036   |
| Age              | -0.0270  | 0.0142     | -1.90   | 0.0570   |
| TradLeader       | 0.0094   | 0.0061     | 1.54    | 0.1242   |
| WomensRights     | -0.0078  | 0.0824     | -0.09   | 0.9248   |
| Dispute          | -0.1055  | 0.1242     | -0.87   | 0.3821   |
| UNMILgood        | 1.2889   | 0.4112     | 3.13    | 0.0017   |

Table 11: Prefer UNMIL to respond to armed conflict (in-depth contact)

|                  | Estimate | Std. Error | z value | Pr(>|z|) |
|------------------|----------|------------|---------|----------|
| (Intercept)      | 0.1043   | 1.2099     | 0.09    | 0.9313   |
| FemContactScore  | -0.3252  | 0.1661     | -1.96   | 0.0502   |
| SecurityContact  | 0.1063   | 0.1105     | 0.96    | 0.3362   |
| ArmedGroup       | -0.0362  | 0.3469     | -0.10   | 0.9168   |
| Female           | 0.2491   | 0.3563     | 0.70    | 0.4846   |
| Live             | -0.0227  | 0.0178     | -1.27   | 0.2034   |
| Age              | 0.0291   | 0.0200     | 1.46    | 0.1442   |
| TradLeader       | 0.0048   | 0.0082     | 0.58    | 0.5688   |
| WomensRights     | -0.1266  | 0.1160     | -1.09   | 0.2751   |
| Dispute          | 0.1693   | 0.1831     | 0.92    | 0.3553   |
| UNMILgood        | 1.6769   | 0.3866     | 4.34    | 0.0000   |

Table 12: Prefer UNMIL to respond to armed conflict (contact with female LNP)

|                  | Estimate | Std. Error | z value | Pr(>|z|) |
|------------------|----------|------------|---------|----------|
| (Intercept)      | 0.1465   | 1.1862     | 0.12    | 0.9041   |
| FemContactLNP    | 0.6944   | 0.5752     | 1.21    | 0.2273   |
| FemLNPTakeCase   | -1.3576  | 0.5295     | -2.56   | 0.0103   |
| SecurityContact  | -0.0197  | 0.1008     | -0.20   | 0.8451   |
| ArmedGroup       | 0.0084   | 0.3494     | 0.02    | 0.9890   |
| Female           | 0.2932   | 0.3620     | 0.81    | 0.4180   |
| Live             | -0.0190  | 0.0176     | -1.08   | 0.2804   |
| Age              | 0.0266   | 0.0199     | 1.33    | 0.1824   |
| TradLeader       | 0.0058   | 0.0085     | 0.68    | 0.4964   |
| WomensRights     | -0.1177  | 0.1154     | -1.02   | 0.3075   |
| Dispute          | 0.1771   | 0.1821     | 0.97    | 0.3310   |
| UNMILgood        | 1.6235   | 0.3942     | 4.12    | 0.0000   |
Table 13: Prefer LNP to respond to armed conflict (simple contact)

|                      | Estimate | Std. Error | z value | Pr(>|z|) |
|----------------------|----------|------------|---------|----------|
| (Intercept)          | 3.7635   | 1.4100     | 2.67    | 0.0076   |
| FemContact           | 1.6554   | 0.6477     | 2.56    | 0.0106   |
| SecurityContact      | -0.0697  | 0.1183     | -0.59   | 0.5555   |
| ArmedGroup           | -0.0823  | 0.3572     | -0.23   | 0.8179   |
| Female               | -0.2881  | 0.3984     | -0.72   | 0.4695   |
| Live                 | -0.0485  | 0.0172     | -2.82   | 0.0048   |
| Age                  | 0.0201   | 0.0204     | 0.98    | 0.3260   |
| TradLeader           | -0.0011  | 0.0089     | -0.13   | 0.8999   |
| WomensRights         | -0.3122  | 0.1492     | -2.09   | 0.0363   |
| Dispute              | -0.1894  | 0.1615     | -1.17   | 0.2409   |
| UNMILgood            | 0.4405   | 0.4659     | 0.95    | 0.3445   |

Table 14: Prefer LNP to respond to armed conflict (contact with female LNP)

|                      | Estimate | Std. Error | z value | Pr(>|z|) |
|----------------------|----------|------------|---------|----------|
| (Intercept)          | 3.9237   | 1.4445     | 2.72    | 0.0066   |
| FemContactLNP        | 2.2321   | 0.7870     | 2.84    | 0.0046   |
| FemLNPTakeCase       | -0.7353  | 0.7241     | -1.02   | 0.3099   |
| SecurityContact      | -0.0287  | 0.1099     | -0.26   | 0.7940   |
| ArmedGroup           | -0.0428  | 0.3594     | -0.12   | 0.9053   |
| Female               | -0.2872  | 0.4004     | -0.72   | 0.4732   |
| Live                 | -0.0501  | 0.0170     | -2.94   | 0.0033   |
| Age                  | 0.0218   | 0.0205     | 1.06    | 0.2885   |
| TradLeader           | -0.0013  | 0.0090     | -0.14   | 0.8851   |
| WomensRights         | -0.3217  | 0.1547     | -2.08   | 0.0376   |
| Dispute              | -0.2210  | 0.1606     | -1.38   | 0.1688   |
| UNMILgood            | 0.3863   | 0.4735     | 0.82    | 0.4146   |

Table 15: Prefer female LNP to respond to riot (contact with female peacekeeper)

|                      | Estimate | Std. Error | z value | Pr(>|z|) |
|----------------------|----------|------------|---------|----------|
| (Intercept)          | 0.3337   | 0.8383     | 0.40    | 0.6906   |
| FemContactPeacekeeping | 1.3857 | 0.6084     | 2.28    | 0.0227   |
| FemPeacekeepingTakeCase | 0.5600 | 0.7570     | 0.74    | 0.4594   |
| SecurityContact      | -0.1622  | 0.0606     | -2.68   | 0.0074   |
| ArmedGroup           | -0.2762  | 0.2626     | -1.05   | 0.2928   |
| Female               | -0.1303  | 0.2670     | -0.49   | 0.6263   |
| Live                 | 0.0191   | 0.0135     | 1.41    | 0.1586   |
| Age                  | -0.0113  | 0.0338     | -0.32   | 0.7460   |
| TradLeader           | -0.0064  | 0.0058     | -1.11   | 0.2675   |
| WomensRights         | 0.1231   | 0.0792     | 1.55    | 0.1200   |
| Dispute              | -0.3499  | 0.1259     | -2.78   | 0.0054   |
| UNMILgood            | 0.2619   | 0.3489     | 0.75    | 0.4529   |
Table 16: Prefer UNMIL to respond to riot (in-depth contact)

| Estimate     | Std. Error | z value | Pr(>|z|) |
|--------------|------------|---------|----------|
| (Intercept)  | -0.2041    | 1.1616  | -0.18    | 0.8605   |
| FemContactScore | -0.2883   | 0.1544  | -1.87    | 0.0619   |
| SecurityContact | 0.0369    | 0.1009  | 0.37     | 0.7148   |
| ArmedGroup   | -0.3487    | 0.3211  | -1.09    | 0.2775   |
| Female       | 0.2444     | 0.3436  | 0.71     | 0.4769   |
| Live         | -0.0120    | 0.0178  | -0.67    | 0.5009   |
| Age          | 0.0309     | 0.0191  | 1.62     | 0.1051   |
| TradLeader   | 0.0164     | 0.0108  | 1.52     | 0.1282   |
| WomensRights | -0.1545    | 0.1107  | -1.40    | 0.1626   |
| Dispute      | 0.1673     | 0.1709  | 0.98     | 0.3277   |
| UNMILgood    | 2.0458     | 0.3843  | 5.32     | 0.0000   |

Table 17: Prefer UNMIL to respond to riot (contact with female LNP)

| Estimate     | Std. Error | z value | Pr(>|z|) |
|--------------|------------|---------|----------|
| (Intercept)  | -0.3865    | 1.1495  | -0.34    | 0.7367   |
| FemContactLNP | 0.2670    | 0.5323  | 0.50     | 0.6159   |
| FemLNPTakeCase | -1.4884  | 0.4984  | -2.99    | 0.0028   |
| SecurityContact | -0.0038  | 0.0966  | -0.04    | 0.9684   |
| ArmedGroup   | -0.3358    | 0.3233  | -1.04    | 0.2990   |
| Female       | 0.3223     | 0.3506  | 0.92     | 0.3581   |
| Live         | -0.0103    | 0.0179  | -0.57    | 0.5666   |
| Age          | 0.0302     | 0.0194  | 1.56     | 0.1197   |
| TradLeader   | 0.0202     | 0.0113  | 1.78     | 0.0748   |
| WomensRights | -0.1265    | 0.1092  | -1.16    | 0.2466   |
| Dispute      | 0.1669     | 0.1707  | 0.98     | 0.3281   |
| UNMILgood    | 2.0334     | 0.3956  | 5.14     | 0.0000   |

Table 18: Prefer LNP to respond to riot (contact with female peacekeepers)

| Estimate     | Std. Error | z value | Pr(>|z|) |
|--------------|------------|---------|----------|
| (Intercept)  | 4.9433     | 1.5193  | 3.25     | 0.0011   |
| FemContactPeacekeeping | 2.8466  | 1.3682  | 2.08     | 0.0375   |
| FemPeacekeepingTakeCase | -2.0210 | 1.3771  | -1.47    | 0.1422   |
| SecurityContact | -0.2312 | 0.0955  | -2.42    | 0.0155   |
| ArmedGroup   | -0.1745    | 0.3945  | -0.44    | 0.6583   |
| Female       | -0.0992    | 0.4271  | -0.23    | 0.8164   |
| Live         | -0.0061    | 0.0201  | -0.30    | 0.7639   |
| Age          | -0.0193    | 0.0205  | -0.94    | 0.3476   |
| TradLeader   | 0.0071     | 0.0106  | 0.67     | 0.5031   |
| WomensRights | -0.3135    | 0.5156  | -0.49    | 0.6231   |
| Dispute      | -0.3135    | 0.1633  | -1.92    | 0.0546   |
| UNMILgood    | 0.8482     | 0.4573  | 1.85     | 0.0636   |
Table 19: Prefer LNP to respond to riot (contact with female LNP)

|                  | Estimate | Std. Error | z value | Pr(>|z|) |
|------------------|----------|------------|---------|----------|
| (Intercept)      | 4.5720   | 1.5174     | 3.01    | 0.0026   |
| FemContactLNP    | 1.1106   | 0.6406     | 1.73    | 0.0830   |
| FemLNPTakeCase   | -0.5289  | 0.5772     | -0.92   | 0.3595   |
| SecurityContact  | -0.2173  | 0.1034     | -2.10   | 0.0356   |
| ArmedGroup       | -0.1790  | 0.3099     | -0.56   | 0.5743   |
| Female           | -0.0974  | 0.4250     | -0.23   | 0.8188   |
| Live             | 0.0020   | 0.0200     | 0.10    | 0.9218   |
| Age              | -0.0181  | 0.0203     | -0.89   | 0.3723   |
| TradLeader       | 0.0041   | 0.0108     | 0.38    | 0.7014   |
| WomensRights     | -0.2234  | 0.1572     | -1.42   | 0.1553   |
| Dispute          | -0.2982  | 0.1616     | -1.85   | 0.0650   |
| UNMILgood        | 1.0045   | 0.4585     | 2.19    | 0.0285   |

Table 20: Prefer female peacekeeper to respond to rape (simple contact)

|                  | Estimate | Std. Error | z value | Pr(>|z|) |
|------------------|----------|------------|---------|----------|
| (Intercept)      | 0.2020   | 0.8162     | 0.25    | 0.8045   |
| FemContact       | -0.6623  | 0.3678     | -1.80   | 0.0717   |
| SecurityContact  | -0.0321  | 0.0710     | -0.45   | 0.6513   |
| ArmedGroup       | -0.1728  | 0.2547     | -0.68   | 0.4976   |
| Female           | -0.0576  | 0.2597     | -0.22   | 0.8245   |
| Live             | 0.0049   | 0.0130     | 0.38    | 0.7034   |
| Age              | -0.0012  | 0.0033     | -0.09   | 0.9276   |
| TradLeader       | 0.0021   | 0.0056     | 0.38    | 0.7028   |
| WomensRights     | 0.0356   | 0.0769     | 0.46    | 0.6436   |
| Dispute          | -0.0870  | 0.1171     | -0.74   | 0.4574   |
| UNMILgood        | 0.2427   | 0.3407     | 0.71    | 0.4761   |

Table 21: Prefer female peacekeeper to respond to rape (contact with female LNP)

|                  | Estimate | Std. Error | z value | Pr(>|z|) |
|------------------|----------|------------|---------|----------|
| (Intercept)      | 0.1624   | 0.8197     | 0.20    | 0.8429   |
| FemContactLNP    | -0.8989  | 0.3902     | -2.30   | 0.0213   |
| FemLNPTakeCase   | 0.0867   | 0.3749     | 0.23    | 0.8172   |
| SecurityContact  | -0.0160  | 0.0684     | -0.23   | 0.8148   |
| ArmedGroup       | -0.1862  | 0.2568     | -0.73   | 0.4684   |
| Female           | -0.0517  | 0.2617     | -0.20   | 0.8435   |
| Live             | 0.0049   | 0.0129     | 0.38    | 0.7020   |
| Age              | -0.0023  | 0.0134     | -0.17   | 0.8615   |
| TradLeader       | 0.0025   | 0.0057     | 0.45    | 0.6550   |
| WomensRights     | 0.0384   | 0.0780     | 0.49    | 0.6224   |
| Dispute          | -0.0785  | 0.1169     | -0.67   | 0.5021   |
| UNMILgood        | 0.2491   | 0.3423     | 0.73    | 0.4668   |
Table 22: Prefer female LNP to respond to rape (in-depth contact)

| Estimate | Std. Error | z value | Pr(>|z|) |
|----------|------------|---------|----------|
| (Intercept) | 0.8303 | 1.0074 | -0.82 | 0.4098 |
| FemContactScore | 0.2724 | 0.1509 | 1.80 | 0.0711 |
| SecurityContact | -0.2895 | 0.0877 | -3.30 | 0.0010 |
| ArmedGroup | -0.5352 | 0.2952 | -1.81 | 0.0699 |
| Female | -0.0068 | 0.3369 | -0.29 | 0.7737 |
| Live | -0.0059 | 0.0166 | -0.36 | 0.7218 |
| Age | 0.0300 | 0.0177 | 0.73 | 0.4626 |
| TradLeader | 0.0056 | 0.0053 | 0.67 | 0.5082 |
| WomensRights | 0.2278 | 0.0906 | 2.52 | 0.0116 |
| Dispute | -0.1192 | 0.1395 | -0.85 | 0.3927 |
| UNMILgood | -0.4324 | 0.4882 | -0.89 | 0.3758 |

Table 23: Prefer female LNP to respond to rape (contact with female LNP)

| Estimate | Std. Error | z value | Pr(>|z|) |
|----------|------------|---------|----------|
| (Intercept) | 0.8450 | 1.0223 | 0.83 | 0.4085 |
| FemContactLNP | 0.1590 | 0.4719 | 0.34 | 0.7362 |
| FemLNPTakeCase | 0.9375 | 0.4801 | 1.95 | 0.0509 |
| SecurityContact | -0.2484 | 0.0807 | -3.08 | 0.0021 |
| ArmedGroup | -0.5562 | 0.2976 | -1.90 | 0.0576 |
| Female | -0.1750 | 0.3431 | -0.51 | 0.6099 |
| Live | -0.0062 | 0.0170 | -0.36 | 0.7162 |
| Age | 0.0141 | 0.0178 | 0.79 | 0.4295 |
| TradLeader | 0.0036 | 0.0084 | 0.43 | 0.6663 |
| WomensRights | 0.2166 | 0.0919 | 2.36 | 0.0184 |
| Dispute | -0.1345 | 0.1399 | -0.96 | 0.3362 |
| UNMILgood | -0.3777 | 0.4934 | -0.77 | 0.4441 |

Table 24: Prefer UNMIL to respond to rape (simple contact)

| Estimate | Std. Error | z value | Pr(>|z|) |
|----------|------------|---------|----------|
| (Intercept) | -1.0842 | 0.8588 | -1.26 | 0.2068 |
| FemContact | -0.9023 | 0.3795 | -2.38 | 0.0174 |
| SecurityContact | -0.0004 | 0.0732 | -0.01 | 0.9959 |
| ArmedGroup | 0.0059 | 0.2631 | 0.02 | 0.9822 |
| Female | 0.0671 | 0.2652 | 0.25 | 0.8002 |
| Live | -0.0196 | 0.0133 | -1.47 | 0.1426 |
| Age | 0.0026 | 0.0136 | 0.19 | 0.8510 |
| TradLeader | -0.0017 | 0.0057 | -0.31 | 0.7601 |
| WomensRights | 0.2138 | 0.0833 | 2.57 | 0.0103 |
| Dispute | -0.0103 | 0.1199 | -0.09 | 0.9316 |
| UNMILgood | 0.0065 | 0.3487 | 0.02 | 0.9850 |
Table 25: Prefer UNMIL to respond to rape (contact with female LNP)

|                     | Estimate | Std. Error | z value | Pr(>|z|) |
|---------------------|----------|------------|---------|----------|
| (Intercept)         | -1.2701  | 0.8726     | -1.46   | 0.1455   |
| FemContactLNP       | -0.9209  | 0.3975     | -2.32   | 0.0205   |
| FemLNPTakeCase      | -0.4709  | 0.3885     | -1.21   | 0.2254   |
| SecurityContact     | 0.0275   | 0.0701     | 0.39    | 0.6949   |
| ArmedGroup          | 0.0092   | 0.2662     | 0.03    | 0.9723   |
| Female              | 0.1112   | 0.2682     | 0.41    | 0.6783   |
| Live                | -0.0198  | 0.0134     | -1.48   | 0.1400   |
| Age                 | 0.0006   | 0.0137     | 0.04    | 0.9653   |
| TradLeader          | -0.0002  | 0.0058     | -0.03   | 0.9767   |
| WomensRights        | 0.2351   | 0.0859     | 2.74    | 0.0062   |
| Dispute             | 0.0001   | 0.1198     | 0.00    | 0.9990   |
| UNMILgood           | 0.0080   | 0.3518     | 0.02    | 0.9819   |

Table 26: Prefer female peacekeeper to respond to domestic violence (in-depth contact)

|                     | Estimate | Std. Error | z value | Pr(>|z|) |
|---------------------|----------|------------|---------|----------|
| (Intercept)         | -1.1408  | 0.8874     | -1.29   | 0.1986   |
| FemContactScore     | -0.3517  | 0.1436     | -2.45   | 0.0143   |
| SecurityContact     | 0.0106   | 0.0784     | 0.13    | 0.8927   |
| ArmedGroup          | -0.3044  | 0.2749     | -1.11   | 0.2681   |
| Female              | -0.1047  | 0.2607     | -0.39   | 0.6979   |
| Live                | 0.0008   | 0.0133     | 0.06    | 0.9528   |
| Age                 | -0.0084  | 0.0138     | -0.61   | 0.5450   |
| TradLeader          | -0.0016  | 0.0060     | -0.26   | 0.7935   |
| WomensRights        | 0.1967   | 0.0876     | 2.25    | 0.0247   |
| Dispute             | -0.1405  | 0.1260     | -1.12   | 0.2648   |
| UNMILgood           | 0.3534   | 0.3596     | 0.98    | 0.3258   |

Table 27: Prefer female peacekeeper to respond to domestic violence (simple contact)

|                     | Estimate | Std. Error | z value | Pr(>|z|) |
|---------------------|----------|------------|---------|----------|
| (Intercept)         | -0.9025  | 0.8859     | -1.02   | 0.3084   |
| FemContact          | -1.0733  | 0.3983     | -2.70   | 0.0070   |
| SecurityContact     | 0.0148   | 0.0761     | 0.20    | 0.8453   |
| ArmedGroup          | -0.3188  | 0.2769     | -1.15   | 0.2496   |
| Female              | -0.1357  | 0.2714     | -0.50   | 0.6171   |
| Live                | -0.0014  | 0.0134     | -0.10   | 0.9198   |
| Age                 | -0.0074  | 0.0139     | -0.54   | 0.5923   |
| TradLeader          | -0.0009  | 0.0060     | -0.15   | 0.8780   |
| WomensRights        | 0.1898   | 0.0877     | 2.16    | 0.0304   |
| Dispute             | -0.1403  | 0.1256     | -1.12   | 0.2639   |
| UNMILgood           | 0.2515   | 0.3640     | 0.69    | 0.4897   |
Table 28: Prefer female peacekeeper to respond to domestic violence (contact with female LNP)

|                  | Estimate | Std. Error | z value | Pr(>|z|) |
|------------------|----------|------------|---------|----------|
| (Intercept)      | -1.0283  | 0.8943     | -1.15   | 0.2502   |
| FemContactLNP    | -1.1353  | 0.4258     | -2.67   | 0.0077   |
| FemLNPTakeCase   | -0.0456  | 0.4152     | -0.11   | 0.9126   |
| SecurityContact  | 0.0103   | 0.0727     | 0.14    | 0.8868   |
| ArmedGroup       | -0.3360  | 0.2776     | -1.21   | 0.2261   |
| Female           | -0.1219  | 0.2730     | -0.45   | 0.6553   |
| Live             | -0.0001  | 0.0134     | -0.00   | 0.9965   |
| Age              | -0.0095  | 0.0139     | -0.68   | 0.4965   |
| TradLeader       | -0.0004  | 0.0061     | -0.06   | 0.9498   |
| WomensRights     | 0.1991   | 0.0896     | 2.22    | 0.0263   |
| Dispute          | -0.1203  | 0.1247     | -0.96   | 0.3348   |
| UNMILgood        | 0.2804   | 0.3653     | 0.77    | 0.4427   |

Table 29: Prefer female LNP to respond to domestic violence (simple contact)

|                  | Estimate | Std. Error | z value | Pr(>|z|) |
|------------------|----------|------------|---------|----------|
| (Intercept)      | 1.5362   | 0.9492     | 1.62    | 0.1056   |
| FemContact       | -0.8283  | 0.4267     | -1.94   | 0.0522   |
| SecurityContact  | -0.0851  | 0.0791     | -1.08   | 0.2819   |
| ArmedGroup       | -0.2530  | 0.2984     | -0.85   | 0.3966   |
| Female           | -0.0952  | 0.3101     | -0.31   | 0.7588   |
| Live             | 0.0138   | 0.0162     | 0.85    | 0.3960   |
| Age              | -0.0078  | 0.0157     | -0.50   | 0.6192   |
| TradLeader       | -0.0058  | 0.0060     | -0.96   | 0.3381   |
| WomensRights     | 0.2233   | 0.0865     | 2.58    | 0.0098   |
| Dispute          | -0.4705  | 0.1326     | -3.55   | 0.0004   |
| UNMILgood        | -0.2849  | 0.4271     | -0.67   | 0.5047   |

Table 30: Prefer female LNP to respond to domestic violence (contact with female LNP)

|                  | Estimate | Std. Error | z value | Pr(>|z|) |
|------------------|----------|------------|---------|----------|
| (Intercept)      | 1.6192   | 0.9589     | 1.69    | 0.0913   |
| FemContactLNP    | -0.5887  | 0.4319     | -1.36   | 0.1728   |
| FemLNPTakeCase   | 1.1470   | 0.4349     | 2.64    | 0.0083   |
| SecurityContact  | -0.2063  | 0.0782     | -2.64   | 0.0083   |
| ArmedGroup       | -0.3314  | 0.2936     | -1.13   | 0.2589   |
| Female           | -0.1650  | 0.3165     | -0.52   | 0.6021   |
| Live             | 0.0186   | 0.0166     | 1.12    | 0.2620   |
| Age              | -0.0069  | 0.0159     | -0.44   | 0.6620   |
| TradLeader       | -0.0098  | 0.0061     | -1.59   | 0.1115   |
| WomensRights     | 0.1854   | 0.0881     | 2.10    | 0.0353   |
| Dispute          | -0.4287  | 0.1311     | -3.27   | 0.0011   |
| UNMILgood        | -0.2228  | 0.4358     | -0.51   | 0.6092   |
Table 31: Inspired to join the security forces (in-depth contact), N=249

|                  | Estimate | Std. Error | z value | Pr(>|z|) |
|------------------|----------|------------|---------|----------|
| (Intercept)      | -2.0623  | 1.4451     | -1.43   | 0.1535   |
| FemContactScore  | 0.4258   | 0.1880     | 2.26    | 0.0235   |
| SecurityContact  | -0.1377  | 0.1280     | -1.08   | 0.2821   |
| ArmedGroup       | -1.1176  | 0.7428     | -1.50   | 0.1325   |
| Live             | -0.0269  | 0.0250     | -1.08   | 0.2824   |
| Age              | 0.0098   | 0.0215     | 0.46    | 0.6481   |
| TradLeader       | -0.0383  | 0.0421     | -0.91   | 0.3626   |
| WomensRights     | 0.0768   | 0.1322     | 0.58    | 0.5614   |
| Dispute          | 0.2925   | 0.1967     | 1.49    | 0.1370   |
| UNMILgood        | -0.5638  | 0.5040     | -1.12   | 0.2634   |

Table 32: Inspired to join the security forces (contact with female LNP or female peacekeeper), N= 249

|                  | Estimate | Std. Error | z value | Pr(>|z|) |
|------------------|----------|------------|---------|----------|
| (Intercept)      | -2.5180  | 1.5137     | -1.66   | 0.0962   |
| FemContactPeacekeeping | 0.8285  | 1.0555     | 0.78    | 0.4325   |
| FemPeacekeepingTakeCase | 0.1945  | 1.1005     | 0.18    | 0.8597   |
| FemContactLNP     | 1.7623   | 0.6552     | 2.69    | 0.0072   |
| FemLNPTakeCase    | 0.5363   | 0.5821     | 0.92    | 0.3569   |
| SecurityContact   | -0.2921  | 0.1546     | -1.89   | 0.0588   |
| ArmedGroup        | -1.3395  | 0.7743     | -1.73   | 0.0837   |
| Live              | -0.0266  | 0.0260     | -1.02   | 0.3062   |
| Age               | 0.0133   | 0.0222     | 0.60    | 0.5505   |
| TradLeader        | -0.0439  | 0.0490     | -0.90   | 0.3704   |
| WomensRights      | 0.0945   | 0.1373     | 0.69    | 0.4911   |
| Dispute           | 0.3220   | 0.2003     | 1.61    | 0.1080   |
| UNMILgood         | -0.4104  | 0.5189     | -0.79   | 0.4291   |
### APPENDIX B: Descriptive Statistics of Key Variable Used

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APPENDIX C

The Ipods and isurvey program transferred the data onto a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. However, because we had two surveys conducted separately, I had to merge the respondents to each other from the two different surveys based on the zone and household code. Because the initial survey included a number of questions on dispute resolution, health, and other factors, I created a new spreadsheet with the variables of interest for my study. Then, I excluded the respondents who did not have a dispute because they did not go on to take the main survey, which included questions about the security sector. I then created the scores, which comprise the difference dependent variables, based on the questions. Questions included:

Female Security Contact
The following were aggregated together as one point for answering yes.

Have you interacted with a female LNP police officer?
  0=no
  1=yes
  99=don’t know

Did a female LNP officer hear your complaint?
  0=no
  1=yes
  99=don’t know

Have you interacted with a Liberian female Women and Children’s Protection Unit police officer in the community? (Talk to them, report a case, etc.)
  0=no
  1=yes
  99=don’t know

Did a female Women and Children’s Protection Unit officer take your case?
  0=no
  1=yes
  99=don’t know

Have you interacted female UNMIL peacekeeper?
  0=no
  1=yes
  99=don’t know

Did a female UNMIL peacekeeper hear the complaint?
  0=no
  1=yes
99=don’t know

Security Provision
If they answered with any answer in bold, they received a 1.

233. Who do you think should provide security to the community?
   1=Religious Leaders
   2=Liberian NGO
   3=International NGOs
   4=Women’s Group
   5=Council of Elders/Community Leader/Community Watch
   6=Police
   7=Judges
   8=Township Commissioner
   9=Peacekeeper
   10=AFL

235. Who do you think should provide security when there is armed violence in the community?
   1=Religious Leaders
   2=Liberian NGO
   3=International NGOs
   4=Women’s Group
   5=Council of Elders/Community Leader/Community Watch
   6=Police
   7=Judges
   8=Township Commissioner
   9=Peacekeeper
   10=AFL

237. Who do you think should provide security when there is riot in the community?
   1=Religious Leaders
   2=Liberian NGO
   3=International NGOs
   4=Women’s Group
   5=Council of Elders/Community Leader/Community Watch
   6=Police
   7=Judges
   8=Township Commissioner
   9=Peacekeeper
   10=AFL
239. Who do you think can best protect you from being raped?

1=Religious Leaders
2=Liberian NGO
3=International NGOs
4=Women’s Group
5=Council of Elders/Community Leader/Community Watch
6=Police
7=Judges
8=Township Commissioner
9=Peacekeeper
10=AFL

241. Who do you think can best protect you from being beaten?

1=Religious Leaders
2=Liberian NGO
3=International NGOs
4=Women’s Group
5=Council of Elders/Community Leader/Community Watch
6=Police
7=Judges
8=Township Commissioner
9=Peacekeeper
10=AFL

Female Security Provision

Who do you think should provide security to the community?

1=Female Peacekeepers
2=Male Peacekeepers
3=Female Police Officer
4=Male Police Officer
5=Male community leader/community watch
6=Female community leader/community watch
7=Male AFL soldier
8=Female AFL soldier

234. Who do you think can best provide protection when there is armed violence in the community?

1=Female Peacekeepers
2=Male Peacekeepers
3=Female Police Officer
4=Male Police Officer
236. Who do you think can best protect you in a riot?

1=Female Peacekeepers
2=Male Peacekeepers
3=Female Police Officer
4=Male Police Officer
5=Male community leader/community watch
6=Female community leader/community watch
7=Male AFL soldier
8=Female AFL soldier

238. Who do you think can best protect you from being raped?

1=Female Peacekeepers
2=Male Peacekeepers
3=Female Police Officer
4=Male Police Officer
5=Male community leader/community watch
6=Female community leader/community watch
7=Male AFL soldier
8=Female AFL soldier

240. Who do you think can best protect you from being beaten?

1=Female Peacekeepers
2=Male Peacekeepers
3=Female Police Officer
4=Male Police Officer
5=Male community leader/community watch
6=Female community leader/community watch
7=Male AFL soldier
8=Female AFL soldier

Inspired to Join Score

228. Assuming you want to join the LNP, why would you like to join the LNP?

1=I have seen UNMIL female officers and they inspire me
2=To gain respect
3=The pay is good
4=I have wanted to be a police officer since I was born
5=I have family in the LNP
6=It is a personal sacrifice to my country
7=To help people
8=It is exciting work
9=To feel powerful and empowered as a woman
10=It is a stable career
11=Other
12=I have seen female LNP or AFL officers and they inspire me

Security Contact
The following were aggregated together as one point for answering yes.

Have you ever interacted with the LNP? (talk to them, take a case there, they confront you) 0=no 1=yes

How many times you went to the police?
  1= one time
  2= 2-4 times
  3= 5+ times

Have you interacted with the Women and Children’s Protection Unit before? (talk to them, report a case, etc.)
  0=no
  1=yes
  99=don’t know

How many times you go to the Women and Children’s Protection Unit?
  1= one time
  2= 2-4 times
  3= 5+ times

Have you talked to UNMIL peacekeeper before?
  0=no
  1=yes

How many times you talk to UNMIL peacekeeper?
  1=one time
  2=2-4 times
  3=5+ times

Women’s Rights
The scores were aggregated based on answering 1. I also conducted Mokken analysis to make sure that they scale.

Can a husband be found guilty for raping his wife?
  1=Yes
  0=No
2=Don’t know

Can it be a crime to beat one’s wife?
   1=Yes
   0=No
   2=Don’t know

Do you think that women should be community leaders?
   1=Yes
   0=No
   99=Don’t know

Do you think that women should join the LNP?
   1=Yes
   0=No
   99=Don’t know

Do you think that women should join the military?
   1=Yes
   0=No
   99=Don’t know

Do you think that female peacekeepers are better than male peacekeepers?
   1=Yes
   0=No
   99=Don’t know

Can a woman do anything a man can do?
   1=Yes
   0=No
   99=Don’t know

Do you think that beating/domestic violence is a problem in Liberia?
   1=Yes
   0=No
   99=Don’t know

Do you think that rape is a problem in Liberia?
   1=Yes
   0=No
   99=Don’t know
The yellow squares represent the randomly sampled zones. Within each zone, we randomly selected households. The enumerators then used GPS devises to locate the houses. The same procedure was conducted for Peace Island.